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We develop a framework for designing simple and efficient policies for a family of online allocation and
pricing problems, that includes online packing, budget-constrained probing, dynamic pricing, and online
contextual bandits with knapsacks. In each case, we evaluate the performance of our policies in terms of their
regret (i.e., additive gap) relative to an offline controller that is endowed with more information than the
online controller. Our framework is based on Bellman Inequalities, which decompose the loss of an algorithm
into two distinct sources of error: (1) arising from computational tractability issues, and (2) arising from
estimation/prediction of random trajectories. Balancing these errors guides the choice of benchmarks, and
leads to policies that are both tractable and have strong performance guarantees. In particular, in all our
examples, we demonstrate constant-regret policies that only require re-solving an LP in each period, followed
by a simple greedy action-selection rule; thus, our policies are practical as well as provably near optimal.
Key words : Stochastic Optimization, Approximate Dynamic Programming, Online Resource Allocation,
Dynamic Pricing, Online Packing, Network Revenue Management.
1. Introduction
Online decision-making under uncertainty is widely studied across a variety of fields, including
operations research, control, and computer science. A canonical framework for such problems is
that of Markov decision processes (MDP), with associated use of stochastic dynamic programming
for designing policies. In complex settings, however, such approaches suffer from the known curse-
of-dimensionality; moreover, they also fail to provide insights into structural properties of the
problem: the performance of heuristics, dependence on distributional information, etc.
The above challenges have inspired an alternate approach to designing approximate policies for
MDPs based on the use of benchmarks – proxies for the value function that provide bounds for the
optimal policy, and guide the design of heuristics. The performance of any policy can be quantified
by its additive loss, or regret, relative to any such benchmark; this consequently also bounds the
additive optimality gap, i.e., performance against the optimal policy.
In this work, we develop new policies for online resource-allocation problems: settings where a
finite set of resources is dynamically allocated to arriving requests, with associated constraints
and rewards/costs. Our baseline problem is the online stochastic knapsack problem (henceforth
OnlineKnapsack): a controller has initial inventory B, and requests arrive sequentially over horizon
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2T . Each request has a random type corresponding to a resource requirement-reward pair. Requests
are generated from a known stochastic process, and are revealed upon arrival; the controller must
then decide whether to accept/reject each request, in order to maximize rewards while satisfying
budget constraints. We then consider three variants of this basic setting: (1) online probing, (2)
dynamic pricing, and (3) contextual bandits with knapsacks. These are widely-studied problems,
each of which augments the baseline OnlineKnapsack with additional constraints/controls. The
formal models for these settings are presented in Section 2
Instead of solving each problem in an ad-hoc manner, however, our policies are all derived from
a single underlying framework. In particular, our results can be summarized as follows:
Meta-theorem Given an online allocation problem, we identify an appropriate offline benchmark,
and give a simple online policy – based on solving a tractable optimization problem in each period
– that gets constant regret compared to the benchmark (and thus, compared to the optimal policy).
In more detail, our approach is based on adaptively constructing a benchmark that has additional
(but not necessarily full) information about future randomness. Next, in the spirit of online primal-
dual methods, we use our benchmark to construct a feasible online policy. The centerpiece of
our approach are the Bellman Inequalities, which characterize what benchmarks are feasible, and
also, decompose the regret of an online policy into two distinct terms. The first, which we call
the Bellman Loss, arises from computational considerations, specifically, from requiring that the
benchmark is tractable (instead of a dynamic program which may be intractable); The second,
which we call the Information Loss, accounts for unpredictability across sample paths. Our policies
trade off these two losses to get strong performance guarantees.
Our framework allows flexibility in choosing benchmarks. To understand why this is important,
consider two common benchmarks for dynamic pricing: a controller has inventory B, and posts
prices for T sequential customers, each of who has a random valuation. One common benchmark,
known as the offline or prophet benchmark, considers a controller with full information of all
randomness; it is easy to show that no online policy can get better than Ω(T ) regret against this
benchmark.. An alternate benchmark, known as the ex ante or fluid benchmark, corresponds to
replacing all random quantities with their expectations; here again, no online policy can get better
than Ω(
√
T ) regret (Vera and Banerjee 2020). Our approach however lets us identify benchmarks
which have O(1) regret for all our settings.
Prophet and fluid benchmarks are also widely used in adversarial models of online allocation,
leading to algorithms with worst-case guarantees. In contrast, we consider stochastic inputs, and
consequently get much stronger guarantees. In particular, all our guarantees are parametric and
depend explicitly on the distributions and problem primitives (i.e., constant parameters defining
the instance). All our policies, however, have regret that is independent of the horizon and budgets.
32. Preliminaries and Overview
2.1. Problem Settings and Results
We illustrate our framework by developing low-regret algorithms for the following problems:
Online Stochastic Knapsack. This serves as a baseline for our other problems. The controller
has an initial resource budget B, and items arrive sequentially over T periods. Each item has a
random type j which corresponds to a known resource requirement (or ‘weight’) wj and a random
reward Rj. In period t= T,T − 1, . . . ,1 (where t denotes the time-to-go), we assume the arriving
type is drawn from a finite set [n] from some known distribution p = (p1, . . . , pn). At the start of
each period, the controller observes the type of the arriving item, and must decide to accept or
reject the item. The expected reward from selecting a type-j item is rj =E[Rj].
Online Probing. As before an arriving type j has known expected reward rj, but unknown
realized reward Rj – now the controller has the additional option of probing each request to observe
the realization, and then accept/reject the item based on the revealed reward; the controller can
also choose to accept the item without probing. In addition to the resource budget B, the controller
has an additional probing budget Bp that limits the number of arrivals that can be probed. This
introduces a trade-off between depleting the resource budget B and probing budget Bp. We assume
here that Rj has finite support {rjk}k∈[m] of size m, and define qjk := P[Rj = rjk] for k ∈ [m]. Note
this reduces to OnlineKnapsack when either Bp ≥ T or Bp = 0.
Dynamic Pricing. The controller has an initial inventory B ∈Nd for d different resources. There
are n types of customers, where a customer of type j requests a specific subset Aj ∈ {0,1}d of
resources, and has private valuation Rt ∼ Fj. In each period t, the controller observes the cus-
tomer type j ∈ [n], and if sufficient resources are available, posts a price (fare) f from a finite
set {fj1, . . . , fjm}; the customer then purchases iff Rt > f . The vectors Aj and valuation functions
(Fj : j ∈ [n]) are known, but otherwise arbitrary. More generally, our technique handles probabilis-
tic customer-choice models, where a customer, when presented with a price menu over bundles,
picks a random bundle via some known distribution (which may depend on the menu).
Knapsack with Distribution Learning. We return to the OnlineKnapsack setting where items
of type j ∈ [n] have weight wj and random reward Rj; now however the controller is unaware of
the distribution of Rj, and must learn it from observations. In period t, the controller observes the
arrival-type j, and decides to accept/reject based on observed rewards up to time t. We consider
two feedback models: full feedback where the controller observes Rj regardless of whether the item is
accepted or rejected, and censored feedback where the controller only observes rewards of accepted
items; for the latter (which is sometimes referred to as online contextual bandits with knapsacks),
we assume the rewards Rj have sub-Gaussian tails (Boucheron et al. 2013, Section 2.3).
4Benchmarks and guarantees. Our framework, rabbi (Re-solve and Act Based on the Bellman
Inequalities; see Section 3.2) is based on comparing two ‘controllers’: Offline, who acts optimally
given future information, and a non-anticipative controller Online who tries to follow Offline.
Both start in the same initial state ST . We denote voff as the expected total reward collected by
Offline acting optimally (i.e., according to a Bellman equation) given its information structure.
In contrast, Online uses a non-anticipative policy pi that maps current states to actions, resulting
in a total expected reward vonpi .
Let piR denote the online policy produced by our rabbi framework, and pi denote any non-
anticipative policy. Then the expected regret of piR relative to the chosen offline benchmark is
E[Regret] := voff− vonpiR ≥maxpi [v
on
pi ]− vonpiR
The last inequality, which follows from the fact that vonpi ≤ voff for any pair of benchmark and online
policies, emphasizes that the regret is a bound on the additive gap w.r.t. the best online policy.
For all the above problems, we use the rabbi framework to identify an appropriate benchmark,
with respect to which we get the following guarantees: First, for the OnlineKnapsack, we recover
a result proved in Arlotto and Gurvich (2019), Vera and Banerjee (2020)
Theorem 1 (Theorem 1 in Arlotto and Gurvich (2019)). For known reward distributions
with finite mean, an online policy based on the rabbi framework obtains regret that depends only
on the primitives (n,p,r,w), but is independent of the horizon length T and resource budget B.
The above builds intuition for using rabbi in more complex settings. In particular, the benchmark
used in Theorem 1 is the full-information prophet, which is too loose for obtaining constant regret in
the remaining settings (pricing, probing, and bandits; see Example 1). This is where our framework
helps in guiding the choice of the right benchmark. In particular, we obtain the following results:
Theorem 2 (Online Probing). For reward distributions with finite support of size m, an online-
probing policy based on the rabbi framework (Algorithm 2) obtains regret that depends only on
(n,m,q,p,r), but is independent of horizon length T , resource budget B and probing budget Bp.
Theorem 3 (Dynamic Pricing). For any reward distributions (Fj : j ∈ [n]) and prices f , a
pricing policy based on the rabbi framework (Algorithm 3) obtains regret that depends only on
(A, f ,F1, . . . ,Fn), but is independent of horizon length T and initial budget levels B ∈Nd.
The result for dynamic pricing also extends naturally to resource bundles and general customer-
choice models (see Section 5.5 and Theorem 6 therein).
For the bandit settings, we define a separation parameter δ = minj 6=j′ |E[Rj]/wj −E[Rj′ ]/wj′ |;
this is only for our bounds, and is not known to the algorithm.
5Theorem 4 (Knapsack with Distribution Learning). Assuming the reward distributions are
sub-Gaussian, in the full feedback setting, a policy based on the rabbi framework (Algorithm 5)
obtains regret that depends only on the primitives (n,p,r,w, δ) and is independent of the horizon
length T and knapsack capacity B.
The last result can also be used as a black-box for the censored feedback setting to get an O(logT )
regret guarantee (see Corollary 1 in Section 6.3).
2.2. Overview of our Framework
We develop our framework in the full generality of MDPs in Section 3. To give an overview and
gain insight into the general version, we use OnlineKnapsack as a warm-up. A schema for the
framework is provided in Fig. 1.
In the OnlineKnapsack problem, at any time-to-go t, let Ztj ∈ N denote the (random) number
of type-j arrivals in the remaining t periods. Recall rewards of type-j arrivals have expected value
rj :=E[Rj]. Define Offline to be a controller that knows Zt for all t in advance. The total reward
collected by Offline can be written as an integer linear program
V (t, b|Zt) = max
xa∈Nn
{r′x : w′xa ≤ b,xa ≤Zt}= max
xa,xr∈Nn
{r′xa : w′xa ≤ b,xa + xr =Zt}. (1)
The function V (·|Zt) is thus Offline’s value function (see Fig. 1), where the notation |Zt empha-
sizes that V is conditioned on Zt. Moreover, for every j, the variables xa,j, xr,j represent action
summaries: the number of type-j arrivals accepted and rejected, respectively.
V (·|Zt) can also be represented via Bellman equations. Specifically, at time-to-go t, assuming
Offline has budget b and the arriving type is ξ, the value function obeys the Bellman equation
V (t, b|Zt) = max
{[
rξt +V (t− 1, b−wξt |Zt−1)
]
1{wξt≤b}, V (t− 1, b|Z
t−1)
}
, ∀t, b, ξt.
Next consider the linear programming relaxation for V (t, b)
ϕ(t, b|Zt) := max
xa,xr≥0
{r′xa : w′xa ≤ b,xa + xr =Zt},
It is clear that ϕ is more tractable compared to V , and also, that it approximates V up to an
integrality gap. However, ϕ does not obey a Bellman equation. To circumvent this, we introduce
the notion of Bellman Inequalities, wherein we require that ϕ satisfies Bellman-like conditions for
‘most’ sample paths. Formally, for some random variables LB, we want ϕ to satisfy
ϕ(t, b|Zt)≤max
{
[rξt +ϕ(t− 1, b−wξt |Zt−1)]1{wξt≤b},ϕ(t− 1, b|Zt−1)
}
+LB(t, b).
Note that, if E[LB(t, b)] is small, with expectation taken over Zt, then ϕ ‘almost’ satisfies the
Bellman equations. We henceforth refer to ϕ as a relaxed value for V and LB the Bellman Loss.
6Offline Value Offline Controls
Online Policy
ϕ based on problem structure
ϕˆ based on ϕControls based on ϕˆ
(I)
(II)(III)
Figure 1 The rabbi framework: We first define Offline’s value function by specifying access to future infor-
mation. Next, we identify a tractable relaxation ϕ for Offline’s value under this same information
structure (step I). Finally, we introduce a non-anticipative estimate ϕˆ for ϕ, and use it to design online
controls (step II). The resulting online policy is evaluated against Offline’s value (step III).
Establishing that actions derived from ϕ are nearly optimal for Offline accomplishes step (I)
in Fig. 1. For step (II), we want to emulate Offline by estimating ϕ based on current information.
A natural estimate is obtained by taking expectations over future randomness, to get:
ϕˆ(t, b) := max
ya,yr≥0
{r′ya : w′ya ≤ b,ya + yr =E[Zt]}.
Note that ϕˆ does not approximate V or ϕ up to a constant additive error Vera and Banerjee (2020);
however, ϕˆ can be used as a predictor for the action taken by Offline. Specifically, at time t with
current budget b, rabbi first computes ϕˆ(t, b) and then interprets the solution y as a score for each
action (here, accept/reject). We show that taking the action with the highest score (i.e., action
argmaxu∈{a,r}{yξt,u}) guarantees that that Online and Offline play the same action with high
probability. Whenever Offline and Online play different actions, then we incur a loss, which we
refer to as the Information Loss, as it quantifies how having less information impacts Online’s
actions. This process of using ϕˆ to derive actions is represented as step (III) in Fig. 1.
Towards a general framework. For all the problems in Section 2.1, our approach uses a similar
three-step process, wherein we choose an Offline benchmark, identify relaxed value ϕ via appro-
priate optimization problem, and get an online policy based on estimate ϕˆ. Consequently, we refer
to our framework as rabbi, which stands for Re-solve and Act Based on Bellman Inequalities.
Our work builds on constant-regret policies for multidimensional packing Vera and Banerjee
(2020), and more general online optimization problems (Banerjee and Freund 2020). The techniques
developed in these works, however, have two fundamental shortcomings that prevent them from
addressing the settings we consider:
• Use of full-information benchmarks: Existing works (Arlotto and Gurvich 2019, Vera and
Banerjee 2020, Banerjee and Freund 2020) use the full information benchmark, which is too loose
for our settings. Indeed, for probing/pricing/learning settings, no algorithm can have constant
regret compared to the full information benchmark (see Example 1).
7• Explicit value-function characterizations: The optimization problem in Eq. (1) has a closed-
form solution, which was used explicitly by (Arlotto and Gurvich 2019, Vera and Banerjee 2020,
Banerjee and Freund 2020); this does not extend to more complex settings.
Our framework in this work resolves these shortcomings in a structured way, allowing us to get
provably near-optimal algorithms for several canonical resource allocation problems. Moreover, we
do so via a generalized notion of information-augmented benchmarks, and our decomposition of the
regret into the Information Loss (capturing randomness in inputs) and Bellman Loss (capturing
limited computational power). This flexibility helps greatly in the design of our algorithms.
2.3. Related Work
Our approach has commonalities with two closely related approaches:
Prophet Inequalities and Ex-Ante Relaxations: A well-studied framework for obtaining
performance guarantees for heuristics policies is to compare against a full information agent, or
“prophet”. This line of work focuses on competitive-ratio bounds, see (Kleinberg and Weinberg
2012, Du¨etting et al. 2017, Correa et al. 2017) for overviews of the area. In particular, (Correa
et al. 2017) obtains a multiplicative guarantee for dynamic posted pricing with a single item under
worst case distribution. A related line of work considers the use of ex-ante LP relaxations Alaei
(2014), Buchbinder et al. (2014) for obtaining worst-case competitive guarantees in online packing
problems. In contrast, we obtain an additive guarantee for multiple items in a parametric setting.
MDP Dual Relaxations. A standard way to get bounds on MDPs is via information-relaxations,
which at a high level, create benchmarks by endowing Offline with additional information, while
forcing it to ‘pay a penalty’ for using this information. (Brown et al. 2010, Balseiro and Brown
2019) use this in a dual-fitting approach, to construct performance bounds for greedy algorithms in
different problems. In contrast, our framework is similar to a primal-dual approach: we adaptively
construct our relaxations, and derive controls directly from them. We compare the two approaches
in more detail in Appendix E.
Moreover, the different problems we apply rabbi each have a large body of prior work.
Online Packing. There is a long line of work on the baseline OnlineKnapsack and generalizations.
A notable work in this line is Jasin and Kumar (2012), who gives a policy with constant expected
regret when the problem instance is far from a set of certain non-degenerate instances. This ineffi-
ciency, though, is fundamental, since they use the ex ante (or fluid) benchmark, which has Ω(
√
T )
under non-degeneracy. More recently, (Bumpensanti and Wang 2020) partially extend the result
of (Arlotto and Gurvich 2019) for more general packing problems; however their policy only gives
8constant regret under i.i.d. Poisson arrivals, and require the system to be scaled linearly (i.e., B
grows proportional to T ). In contrast, (Arlotto and Gurvich 2019) (one dimension) and (Vera and
Banerjee 2020) (multiple dimensions) provide constant regret policies with no assumption on the
scaling. The approach in the latter is further generalized in Banerjee and Freund (2020) to handle
more complex problems including bin-packing and QOS constraints. See Vera and Banerjee (2020),
Banerjee and Freund (2020) for more discussion and references.
Probing. Approximation algorithms have been developed for offline probing problems, both under
budget constraints (Gupta and Nagarajan 2013) and probing costs (Weitzman 1979, Singla 2018).
Another line of work pursues tractable non-adaptive constant-factor competitive algorithms for this
problem (Gupta et al. 2016). In terms of online adaptive algorithms, Chugg and Maehara (2019)
introduces an algorithm with bounded competitive ratio in an adversarial setting.
Dynamic posted pricing. This is a canonical problem in operations management, with a vast
literature; see Talluri and Van Ryzin (2006) for an overview. Much of this literature focuses on
asymptotically optimal policies in regimes where the inventory B and/or horizon T grow large.
When B and T are scaled together by a factor k, there are known algorithms with regret that
scales as O(
√
k) or O(log(k)), depending on assumptions on the primitives (e.g., smoothness of the
demand with price) (Jasin 2014). There is also vast literature on pricing when the demand function
is not known and has to be learned (Chen et al. 2019). Finally, under adversarial arrivals, Babaioff
et al. (2015) provides a policy with O((B logT )2/3) regret under adversarial inputs, as opposed to
our O(1) guarantee under stochastic inputs.
Knapsack with learning. Multi-armed bandit problems have been widely studied, and we refer
to Bubeck et al. (2013, 2012) for an overview. Bandit problems with combinatorial constraints on
the arms are known as Bandits With Knapsacks (Badanidiyuru et al. 2018), and the generalization
where arms arrive online is known as Contextual Bandits With Knapsacks (Badanidiyuru et al.
2014, Agrawal and Devanur 2016). Results in this literature typically study worst-case distributions.
We, in contrast, pursue parametric regret bounds that explicitly depend on the (unknown) discrete
distribution. Closest to our work is Wu et al. (2015), who provide a UCB-based algorithm that
gets O(
√
T ) regret (in contrast, we get O(logT ) regret for the same setting).
3. Approximate Control Policies via the Bellman Inequalities
In this section, we describe our general framework. Before proceeding, we introduce some nota-
tion: We work an underlying probability space (Ω,Σ,P), and for any event B ⊆ Ω, we denote its
complement by Bc. We use boldface letters to indicate vector-valued variables (e.g. p,w, etc.),
and capital letters to denote matrices and/or random variables. For an optimization problem (P ),
we use P to denote its optimal value. When using LP formulations with decision variables x, we
interchangeably use xij = x(i, j) to denote the (i, j)
th component of x.
93.1. Offline Benchmarks and Bellman Inequalities
We consider an online decision-making problem with state space S and action space U , evolving
over periods t= T,T − 1, . . . ,1; here T denotes the horizon, and t is the time to-go. In any period
t, the controller first observes a random arrival ξt ∈ Ξ, following which it must choose an action
u ∈ U . For system-state s ∈ S at the beginning of period t, and random arrival ξ ∈ Ξ, an action
u ∈ U results in a reward R(s, ξ, u), and transition to the next state T (s, ξ, u). We assume both
reward and future state are random variables whose realizations are determined for every u given
ξ. This assumption is for ease of exposition only; our results can be extended to hold when rewards
or transitions are random given ξ.
The feasible actions for state s and input ξ correspond to the set {u∈ U :R(s, ξ, u)>−∞}. We
assume that this feasible set is non-empty for all s∈ S, ξ ∈Ξ, and also, that the maximum reward
is bounded, i.e., sups∈S,ξ∈Ξ,u∈UR(s, ξ, u)<∞.
The MDP described above induces a natural filtration F , with Ft = σ({ξτ : τ ≥ t}); a non-
anticipative policy is one which is adapted to Ft. We allow Offline to use a richer information
filtration G, where Gt ⊇Ft. Note that since t denotes the time-to-go, we have Gt−1 ⊇Gt. Henceforth,
to keep track of the information structure, we use the notation f(·|Gt) to clarify that a function f
is measurable with respect to the sigma-field Gt.
Given any filtration G, Offline is assumed to play the optimal policy adapted to G, hence
Offline’s value function is given by the following Bellman equation:
V (t, s|Gt) = max
u∈U
{R(s, ξt, u) +E[V (t− 1,T (s, ξt, u)|Gt−1)|Gt]}, (2)
with the boundary condition V (0, ·) = 0. We denote the expected value as voff := E[V (T,ST |GT )].
Note that voff is an upper bound on the performance of the optimal non-anticipative policy.
We present a specific class of filtration (generated by augmenting the canonical filtration) that
suffice for our applications (see Fig. 2 for an illustration of the definition).
Definition 1 (Canonical augmented filtration). Let GΘ := (Gθ : θ ∈Θ) be a set of random
variables. The canonical filtration w.r.t. GΘ is
Gt = σ({ξl : l≥ t}∪GΘ)⊇Ft.
The richest augmented filtration is the full information filtration, wherein Gt = F1 for all t, i.e.,
the canonical filtration with GΘ = (ξ
t : t ∈ [T ]). As Gt gets coarser, the difference in performance
between Offline and Online decreases. Indeed, when G =F , then Eq. (2) reduces to the Bellman
equation for the value-function of an optimal non-anticipative policy:
V (t, s|Ft) = max
u∈U
{R(s, ξt, u) +E[V (t− 1,T (s, ξt, u)|Ft−1)]}, V (0, ·, ·) = 0,
where the expectation is taken with respect to the next period’s input ξt−1.
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Figure 2 Illustration of Definition 1. In online probing (see Section 4), arrivals first reveal their public type,
then the controller chooses an action (accept/probe/reject), and then the private type (true reward) is
revealed. Squares (resp. circles) represent public (resp. private) information. The filtration G used by
rabbi comprises of all public types, i.e. GΘ = (ξ
θ : ξθ is a public type). At time t, Offline knows all
the information thus far (to the left and including t), plus the future squares.
Example 1 (Full Information is Too Loose). Consider a dynamic pricing instance with n=
d= 1, prices f = (1,2), and valuation distribution P[Rt = 1+ε] = p and P[Rt = 2+ε] = 1−p. When
B = T , the optimal policy always posts a price that maximizes (f ·P[Rt > f ]). If p≥ 1/2, then the
optimal policy (DP) always posts price f = 1 and has expected reward T . On the other hand, full
information can post price Rt− ε at time t and extract full surplus voff =∑tE[Rt− ε] = T (2− p).
Thus the regret against full information must grow as Ω(T ). This example is not pathological ; the
same behavior persists even in random instances (see Section 5.4).
We are now ready to introduce the notion of relaxed value ϕ and Bellman Inequalities. Intuitively,
ϕ is “almost” defined by a dynamic-programming recursion; quantitatively, whenever ϕ does not
satisfy the Bellman equation, we incur an additional loss LB, which we denote the Bellman loss.
Definition 2 (Bellman Inequalities). The family of r.v. {ϕ(t, s)}t,s satisfies the Bellman
Inequalities w.r.t. filtration G and r.v. {LB(t, s)}t,s if ϕ(t, ·) and LB(t, ·) are Gt-measurable for all
t and the following conditions hold:
1. Initial ordering: E[V (T,ST )|GT ]≤ϕ(T,ST |GT ).
2. Monotonicity: ∀s∈ S, t∈ [T ],
ϕ(t, s|Gt)≤max
u∈U
{R(s, ξt, u) +E[ϕ(t− 1,T (s, ξt, u)|Gt−1)|Gt]}+LB(t, s). (3)
3. Terminal Condition: ϕ(0, s) = 0∀s∈ S
We refer to ϕ and LB as the relaxed value and Bellman loss pair with respect to G, and use |Gt to
remind the reader that we need the information contained in Gt to evaluate ϕ(t, s)
Given any ϕ, monotonicity holds trivially with LB =ϕ (but leads to poor performance guarantees).
On the other hand, ϕ (which may be intractable) is the only value function guaranteeing LB = 0.
The crux of our approach is to identify a good ϕ balances the loss and tractability.
A special case is when the Bellman Loss is 0 over sample paths in some chosen set:
Definition 3 (Exclusion Sets). A set B(t, s) is an exclusion set if we can write the Bellman
Loss as LB(t, s) = rϕ1B(t,s) for some constant rϕ > 0 and events B(t, s)⊆Ω.
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If the Bellman Loss can be defined with exclusion sets, then from Definition 2 (monotonicity) we
obtain the condition ϕ(t, s|Gt) ≤ maxu∈U{R(s, ξt, u) + E[ϕ(t− 1,T (s, ξt, u)|Gt−1)|Gt]}, i.e., mono-
tonicity is satisfied for all realizations ω ∈Ω except for those in the exclusion set B(t, s).
To build intuition, we specify the Bellman Inequalities for our baseline OnlineKnapsack. For
this end, we first need the following lemma characterizing the sensitivity of LP solutions.
Lemma 1. Consider an LP (P [d]) : max{r′x :Mx = d,x≥ 0} , where M ∈ Rm×n is an arbitrary
constraint matrix. If x¯ solves (P [d]) and x¯j ≥ 1 for some j, then P [d] = rj +P [d−Mj].
Proof. By assumption, the optimal value of (P [d]) remains unchanged if we add the inequality
xj ≥ 1. Therefore we have P [d] = max{r′(x + ej) :M(x + ej) = d,x≥ 0}. 
Lemma 1 lets us divide P [d] in two summands: the immediate reward rj and the future reward
P [d−Mj]; this has the flavor of dynamic programming we need for defining the Bellman loss.
Example 2 (Bellman Loss For Baseline Setting). For the baseline OnlineKnapsack, dis-
cussed in Section 2.2, we chose the full information filtration Gt =F1 for all t so that ϕ(t, b|Gt) :=
maxx≥0{r′xa : w′xa ≤ b,xa + xr =Zt}. We define the exclusion sets as
B(t, b) = {ω ∈Ω :6 ∃x solving ϕ(t, b) s.t. x(a, ξt)≥ 1 or x(r, ξt)≥ 1}.
By Lemma 1, outside the exclusion sets B(t, b), monotonicity holds with zero Bellman Loss, i.e.,
ϕ(t, s|Gt)≤max
u∈U
{R(s, ξt, u) +E[ϕ(t− 1,T (s, ξt, u)|Gt−1)|Gt]} ∀ω /∈B(t, s).
Moreover, for our choice of ϕ, since the optimal solution sorts items by rj/wj, we have that the
maximum loss outside the exclusion set is bounded by rϕ ≤maxj,i{wirj/wj − ri}, which depends
only on the primitives. Thus, Definition 2 is satisfied with Bellman Loss LB(t, b) = rϕ1B(t,b) .
To generalize this, we need two definitions. First, we define the maximum Bellman loss as:
Definition 4 (Maximum Loss). For a given relaxation ϕ, the maximum loss is given by
rϕ := max
t,s,u:R(s,ξt,u)>−∞
{ϕ(t, s|Gt)− (R(s, ξt, u) +E[ϕ(t− 1,T (s, ξt, u)|Gt−1)|Gt])}
Next, note that the ‘optimal’ action in the RHS of Eq. (3) need not be unique, and indeed the
inequality can be satisfied by multiple actions. For given ϕ and LB, we define:
Definition 5 (Satisfying actions). Given a filtration G and relaxed value ϕ, we say that u is
a satisfying action for state s at time t if
ϕ(t, s|Gt)≤R(s, ξt, u) +E[ϕ(t− 1,T (s, ξt, u)|Gt−1)|Gt] +LB(t, s). (4)
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At any time t and state s∈ S, any action in argmaxu∈U{R(s, ξt, u)+E[ϕ(t−1,T (s, ξt, u)|Gt−1)|Gt]}
is always a satisfying action (see monotonicity in Definition 2); moreover, to identify a satisfying
action, we must know Gt. We now have the following proposition.
Proposition 1. Consider a relaxation ϕ and Bellman loss LB that satisfy the Bellman inequalities
w.r.t. filtration G. Let (St, t ∈ [T ]) denote the state trajectory under a policy that, at time t, takes
any satisfying action U t =U t(St|Gt). Then,
E
[
V (T,ST |GT )
]−E[ T∑
t=1
R(St, ξt,U t)
]
≤E
[
T∑
t=1
LB(t,S
t|Gt)
]
.
Proof. From the monotonicity condition in the Bellman inequalities (Definition 2), and the defi-
nition of a satisfying action (Definition 5), we have, for all time t, that
ϕ(t,St|Gt)≤E[R(St, ξt,U t) +ϕ(t− 1, St−1|Gt−1) +LB(t,St|Gt)|Gt].
Iterating the above inequality over t we get ϕ(T,ST |GT )≤
∑T
t=1E[R(St, ξt,U t) +LB(t,St|Gt)|Gt].
Finally, by the initial ordering condition we have E[V (T,ST )|GT ]≤ϕ(T,ST |GT ). 
Proposition 1 shows that a policy that always plays a satisfying action U t approximates the per-
formance of Offline up to an additive gap given by the total Bellman loss E
[∑T
t=1LB(t,S
t|Gt)
]
.
More importantly, it suggests that Online should try to track Offline by ‘guessing’ and playing
a satisfying action U t in each period. We next illustrate how Online can generate such guesses.
3.2. From Relaxations to Online Policies
Suppose we are given an augmented canonical filtration Gt = σ({ξl : l≥ t}∪GΘ), and assume that
the relaxed value ϕ can be represented as a function of the random variables {ξl : l ≥ t} ∪GΘ as
ϕ(t, s|Gt) = ϕ(t, s;ft(ξT , . . . , ξt,GΘ)). In particular, we henceforth focus on a special case where ϕ
is expressed as the solution of an optimization problem:
ϕ(t, s;ft(ξ
T , . . . , ξt,GΘ)) = max
x∈RU×Ξ
{ht(x;s, ft(ξT , . . . , ξt,GΘ)) : gt(x;s, ft(ξT , . . . , ξt,GΘ))≤ 0}. (5)
The decision variables give action summaries: for given state s and time t, xu,ξ represents the
number of times action u is taken for input ξ in remaining periods. We can also interpret xu,ξ as
a score for action u when input ξ is presented. Now to get a non-anticipative policy, a natural
‘projection’ of ϕ(t, s|Gt) on the filtration F is given via the following optimization problem
ϕˆ(t, s|Ft) =ϕ(t, s;E[ft(ξT , . . . , ξt,GΘ)|Ft]) = max
y∈RU×Ξ
{ht(y;s,E[ft|Ft]) : gt(y;s,E[ft|Ft])≤ 0}. (6)
The solution of this optimization problem gives action summaries (or scores) y; the main idea of
the RABBI algorithm is to play the action with the highest score.
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RABBI (Re-solve and Act Based on Bellman Inequalities)
Input: Access to functions ft such that ϕ(t, s|Gt) =ϕ(t, s;ft(ξT , . . . , ξt,GΘ)).
Output: Sequence of decisions Uˆ t for Online.
1: Set ST as the given initial state
2: for t= T, . . . ,1 do
3: Compute ϕˆ(t,St) =ϕ(t,St;E[ft(ξT , . . . , ξt,GΘ)|Ft]) with associated scores y = {yu,ξ}u∈U,ξ∈Ξ
4: Given input ξt, choose the action Uˆ t with the highest score yu,ξt
5: Collect reward R(St, ξt, Uˆ t); update state St−1←T (St, ξt, Uˆ t)
Theorem 5. Let Offline be defined by an augmented filtration Gt as in Definition 1. Assume
the relaxation ϕ(t, s) satisfies the Bellman Inequalities with loss LB, and for all (t, a)∈ [T ]×S, let
Q(t, s)⊆Ω denote the set of sample-paths where the action Uˆ t taken by rabbi is not a satisfying
action. If (St, t∈ [T ]) denotes the state trajectory under rabbi, then
E[Regret]≤E
[∑
t
(rϕ1Q(t,St) +1Q(t,St)cLB(t,S
t))
]
≤
∑
t
(rϕP[Q(t,St)] +E[LB(t,St)]) .
Remark 1 (Bellman and Information Loss). The bound in Theorem 5 has two distinct sum-
mands: The information loss
∑
t P[Q(t,St)] measures how often rabbi takes a non-satisfying action
due to randomness in sample paths; on the other hand, the Bellman loss
∑
tE[LB(t,St)]) quantifies
violations of the Bellman equations made under the pseudo value-function ϕ.
Compensated Coupling: The proof of Theorem 5 is based on the compensated coupling approach
introduced in (Vera and Banerjee 2020). The idea is to imagine‘simulating’ controllers Offline
and Online with identical random inputs (ξt : t ∈ [T ]), with Online acting before Offline.
Moreover, suppose at some time t, both controllers are in the same state s. Recall that, for any
given state s at time t, an action u is satisfying if Offline’s value does not decrease when playing
u (Definition 5). If Online chooses to play a satisfying action, then we can make Offline play the
same action, and consequently both move to the same state. On the other hand, if Online chooses
an action that is not satisfying, then the two trajectories may separate; we can avoid this however
by ‘compensating’ Offline so that it ‘agrees’ to take the same action as Online. In particular,
its always sufficient to compensate Offline by the maximum loss rϕ to ensure its reward does not
decrease by following Online. As a consequence, the (compensated) Offline and Online take
the same actions, and thus their trajectories are coupled.
As an example, for OnlineKnapsack with budget B = 2, weights wj = 1∀ j, and horizon T =
5, consider a sample-path ω ∈ Ω with rewards (ξ5, ξ4, ξ3, ξ2, ξ1) = (5,7,2,7,2). The sample-path
comprises of three different types, and the sequence of actions (r,a,r,a,r) ((selecting the value 7
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items) is optimal for Offline, with total reward of 14. Suppose Online, in period t = 5 wants
to accept the item with reward ξ5 = 5; then, Offline is “willing” to follow this action if given a
compensation of 2 (in addition to collected reward 5). Offline and Online then start the next
period t= 4 in the same state with budget 1, hence remain coupled.
Proof of Theorem 5. Denoting Offline’s state as S¯t, we have via Proposition 1 that ∀ t:
ϕ(t, S¯t|Gt)≤E[R(S¯t, ξt,U t) +ϕ(t− 1, S¯t−1|Gt−1) +LB(t, S¯t)|Gt].
Let us assume as the induction hypothesis that S¯t = St. This holds for t= T by definition. At any
time t and state St, if Uˆ t is not a satisfying action for Offline, then we have from the definition
of the maximum loss (Definition 4) that:
rϕ ≥ϕ(t,St|Gt)−R(St, ξt, Uˆ t) +E[ϕ(t− 1, St−1|Gt−1)|Gt]) a.s..
Now to make Offline take action Uˆ t so as to have the same subsequent state as Online, it is
sufficient to compensate Offline with an additional reward of rϕ. Specifically, we have
ϕ(t,St|Gt)≤E[R(St, ξt, Uˆ t) +ϕ(t− 1, St−1|Gt−1) + rϕ1Q(t,St) +1Q(t,St)cLB(t,St)|Gt].
Finally, as in Proposition 1, we can iterate over t to obtain
E[ϕ(T,ST |GT )]≤E
[∑
t
R(St, ξt, Uˆ t) +
∑
t
(rϕ1Q(t,St) +1Q(t,St)cLB(t,S
t))
]
.
The first sum on the right-hand side corresponds exactly to Online’s total reward using the rabbi
policy. By the initial ordering property, E[V (T,ST )]≤E[ϕ(T,ST )], and we get the result. 
4. Online Probing
We now apply our framework to online probing. Here, each arrival type j has an independent
random reward Rj ∈ {rjk : k ∈ [m]} drawn with probabilities {qjk}; r and q are known. We assume
w.l.o.g that rj1 < rj2 < . . . < rjm and rjm > 0. For ease of exposition, we assume that all arrivals
have unit weights; our analysis however extends to general weights wj. The controller may accept
(a), reject (r) or probe (p) the arrival. Accepting type-j item without probing results in expected
reward of r¯j :=
∑
k∈[m] rjkqjk. Probing reveals the realized reward, after which it can be accepted
or rejected. The controller has a resource budget Bh ∈N and a probing budget Bp ∈N. When an
arrival is accepted (resp. probed), we reduce Bh (resp. Bp) by one.
Formally, we view each time period t∈ {T,T −1, . . . ,1} as comprising of a mini dynamic program
with two stages {t, t−1/2}, driven by external random inputs ξt ∈ [n] and ξt−1/2 ∈ [n]× [m]. In the
first stage t, the controller observes the arriving request ξt = j, and chooses an action in {a,p,r};
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in the second stage t− 1/2, the reward rjk (or “sub-type” ξt−1/2 = (j, k)∈ [n]× [m]) is drawn with
probability qjk, and the available actions are {a,r} if the first-stage action is p, and ∅ otherwise.
We augment the state space with a variable  that captures the first stage decision (i.e., whether
we accept/reject without probing or probe). The state space S of the controlled process is thus
S = {(bh, bp,) : bh, bp ∈N, ∈ {a,p,r,∅}}, where bh, bp are the residual hiring and probing budgets.
In first stage of each period, we set =∅, and only collect rewards in second stage in each period.
See Fig. 3 for an illustration.
bh, bp,∅
t t− 1/2 t− 1
bh− 1, bp,a
bh, bp− 1,p
bh, bp,r
bh− 1, bp,∅
bh−1, bp−1,∅
bh, bp, ,∅
bh, bp− 1,∅
0
0
0
Rj
Rj
0
0
Figure 3 Actions/transitions in online probing in periods t, t−1/2, and t−1, with inputs ξt = j and ξt−1/2 =Rj .
Numbers below the arrows represent the reward of a transition. At t, available actions are {a,p,r} (i.e.,
accept, probe, reject; from top to bottom); at t− 1/2, if we chose to probe in the first-stage (i.e., are in
the middle state), then available actions are {a,r}.
4.1. Offline Benchmark and Online Policy for Probing
We now apply the rabbi framework for online probing.
Offline Benchmark: We define Offline to be the controller that knows the public types of
all arrivals in advance (i.e., it knows Ztj , the number of type-j items that will arrive in the last
t periods), but does not know the realization of the rewards (sub-types). Formally, Offline is
endowed with the canonical filtration given by Θ = [T ] and Gθ = ξ
θ (see Definition 1): with t steps
to go, Offline has the information filtration Gt = σ({ξt : t ∈ [T ]} ∪ {ξτ : τ ≥ t}). Note that since
Offline does not know the actual rewards, it still needs to solve a dynamic program to decide
whether or not to probe an arrival.
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Relaxed Value Function: Since solving for Offline’s optimal actions may be non-trivial, we
next construct a relaxed value function ϕ, using the following LP parametrized by (bh, bp,z) ∈
N2×Rn≥0,
(P [bh, bp,z]) maximize:
∑
j,k
rjkxjka +
∑
j
r¯jxja (7)
subject to:
∑
j,k
xjka +
∑
j
xja ≤ bh∑
j
xjp ≤ bp
xja +xjp +xjr = zj ∀ j ∈ [n]
xjka +xjkr = qjkxjp ∀ j ∈ [n], k ∈ [m]
x≥ 0
Intuitively, P [bh, bp,z] can be understood as follows: given current resource and probing budgets
b and future arrivals z, the decision variables x ∈ R3n+2nm≥0 represent action summaries, where
xja, xjr, xjp are the total number of future type-j arrivals that are accepted without probing, rejected
without probing, and probed respectively, and xjka, xjkr are the number of probed future type-j
arrivals that are revealed to have reward rjk, and then accepted/rejected respectively. The first two
constraints implement the resource budget and probing budget; the third ensures the number of
type-j items accepted, probed or rejected equals arrivals of that type. Finally, the last constraint
guarantees that a qjk fraction of probed type-j items have sub-type k (i.e., reward rjk).
To construct relaxed value ϕ, recall that a state is of the form s= (bh, bp,) with  ∈ {a,p,r,∅}.
For period t (i.e., first stage, =∅), we define ϕ(t, (bh, bp,∅)|Gt) := P [bh, bp,Zt]. For t− 1/2 (i.e.,
second stage decisions), we modify ϕ to incorporate the action (a,p,r) taken in the first stage.
Overall, our relaxation is defined as follows
ϕ(t− 1/2, (bh, bp,)|Gt) =

rξt−1/2 +P [(bh, bp),Z
t−1] = a
max{rξt−1/2 +P [(bh− 1, bp),Zt−1], P [(bh, bp),Zt−1]} = p
P [(bh, bp),Z
t−1] = r
(8)
Value Function estimate and Online Policy: Finally we can use the relaxed value function φ
in Eq. (8) to construct an estimated value function ϕˆ by replacing Zt with Eξt−1/2 [Zt]. Using this,
we get our online policy specified in Algorithm 2.
Remark 2 (Probing cost). Our approach can also handle a setting where the controller has no
probing budget, but instead incurs a penalty cj when probing a type-j arrival. The only change
to results and proofs is in the definition of P [b,Z], where we drop the constraint involving the
probing budget, and modify the objective to be max{∑j,k rjkxjka +∑j r¯jxja−∑j cjxjp}
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Algorithm 2 Probing rabbi
Input: Access to solutions of (P [b,z])
Output: Sequence of decisions for Online.
1: Initialize budgets (BTh ,B
T
p )← (Bh,Bp)
2: for period t= T, . . . ,1 do
3: Compute Xt, an optimal solution to (P [Bt,E[Zt]])
4: Observe the arrival, say it is of type j, then take action Uˆ t ∈ argmaxu=a,p,r{Xtj,u}.
5: If Uˆ t = r or Uˆ t = a: collect zero or random Rj, respectively.
6: If Uˆ t = p: probe the arrival to observe Rj = rjk, then take action argmaxu=a,r{Xtj,k,u}
7: Update budgets Bt−1 accordingly.
4.2. Regret Analysis for Online Probing
We now provide a brief outline of the proof of Theorem 2, which guarantees that Algorithm 2 has
a regret that is independent of T,Bh and Bp. Complete proofs are provided in Appendix B.
The main part of the proof involves showing that ϕ as defined in Eq. (8) obeys the Bellman
inequalities (Definition 2) with appropriately chosen Bellman loss. The first ingredient for this is
provided by the following lemma, which establishes initial ordering for our relaxed value ϕ.
Lemma 2. For any bh, bp ∈N, and arrivals Z, E[V (T, (bh, bp)|GT )]≤E[ϕ(T, (bh, bp,∅)|GT )].
This follows from a standard argument, where we argue that any offline policy induces action
summaries that satisfy the constraints defining ϕ. The proof is provided in Appendix B.
The bulk of the work is in establishing monotonicity, which we do via the following lemma.
Recall the definitions of exclusion sets, satisfying actions and maximum loss (Definitions 3 to 5).
Lemma 3. Let X¯ be a maximizer of (P [(bh, bp),Z
t]) for some period t, and suppose ξt = i. Then
we have the following implications for satisfying actions
(1) If X¯ia ≥ 1, then accepting at time t is a satisfying action.
(2) If X¯ir ≥ 1, then rejecting at time t is a satisfying action.
(3) If X¯ip ≥ 1, and ξt−1/2 = (i, k) is such that either X¯ika ≥ 1 or X¯ikr ≥ 1, then probing at time t,
followed by accepting (if X¯ika ≥ 1) or rejecting (if X¯ikr ≥ 1) at time t− 1/2 is a satisfying action.
Finally ϕ satisfies the Bellman Inequalities with Bellman Loss LB(t, (bh, bp)) = rϕ1B(t,bh,bp), where
B are exclusion sets defined as:
B(t, bh, bp) = {ω ∈Ω :6 ∃X¯ solution to (P [(bh, bp),Zt]) s.t. (1) or (2) or (3) hold}.
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The proof generalizes the argument in Example 2 for OnlineKnapsack. We provide a brief out-
line here, and defer the details to Appendix B. First, observe that the monotonicity condition
in Definition 2 translates to the following condition in the online probing setting.
ϕ(t, (bh, bp,∅)|Gt)≤ max∈{a,p,r}{Eξt−1/2 [ϕ(t− 1/2, (s,)|Gt−1/2)|Gt]} ∀ω /∈B(t, bh, bp).
where the state s = (bh−1, bp) if = a, s = (bh, bp−1) if = p and s = (bh, bp) if = r. Moreover,
given ξt = i, we have from Eq. (8) that Eξt−1/2 [ϕ(t − 1/2, (s,))|Gt−1/2)|Gt] = P [(bh, bp),Zt−1] if
 = r, and rξt−1/2 + P [(bh − 1, bp),Zt−1] if  = a. Now for cases (1) and (2), the claim in the
lemma follows directly by invoking Lemma 1. Finally, case (3) (where X¯ip ≥ 1) also follows from
using Lemma 1, but in a somewhat more technical way; see Appendix B for details.
Using Lemmas 2 and 3, we can complete the regret analysis for Algorithm 2.
Proof of Theorem 2. By Theorem 5, we have that Regret ≤ rϕ
∑
t(1B(t,St) + 1Q(t,St)). To
bound this, we proceed in two steps: bounding the measure of the exclusion sets B, and the
“disagreement” sets Q. We conclude using the fact that rϕ ≤maxj,k rjk.
To bound the measure of the exclusion sets B, let X¯ be the solution to (P [b,Zt]), and note that
Lemma 3 guarantees that there is zero Bellman Loss if (1) max{X¯ja, X¯jr} ≥ 1, or (2) X¯jp ≥ 1 and
max{X¯jka, X¯jkr} ≥ 1. The exclusion set B(t,b) comprises sample paths where both (1) and (2) fail.
Note that any feasible solution to (P [b,Zt]) satisfies xja + xjp + xjr = Z
t
j ∀j and xjka + xjkr =
qjkxjp ∀j, k. If Ztj ≥ 3, then one of the variables xja, xjp, xjr must be at least 1. On the other hand,
we need qjkxjp ≥ 2 to guarantee that one of xjka, xjkr is at least 1. Thus we have
P[B(t, b)|ξt−1/2 = (j, k)]≤ P
[
Ztj <
6
qjk
]
= P
[
Ztj −µj(t)<−µj(t)
(
1− 6
µj(t)qjk
)]
. (9)
Restricting µj(t)≥ 12/qjk to ensure the RHS of Eq. (9) is positive, we can use a standard Chernoff
bound (see (Boucheron et al. 2013)) to get P[B(t, b)|ξt−1/2 = (j, k)] ≤ e−2(pj/2)t + 1{t≤12/(pjqjk)}.
Finally, ∑
t
P[B(t,Bt)]≤
∑
t
∑
j
pje
−2(pj/2)t +
∑
t
∑
j,k
pjqjk1{t≤12/(pjqjk)} ≤
∑
j
2
pj
+ 12.
To bound the Information Loss
∑
t P[Q(t,St)], recall Q(t,St)⊆ Ω is the event where Uˆ t is not
satisfying. Let X¯ be a solution to (P [b,Zt]), t a first stage, and let j = ξt. We now have two cases
depending on if Uˆ t ∈ {a,r} or Uˆ t = p. First, if Uˆ t ∈ {a,r}, then according to Lemma 3, accepting or
rejecting is satisfying whenever max{X¯ja, X¯jr} ≥ 1. Since Xt(ξt, Uˆ t) = max{Xt(ξt, u) : u= a,p,r}
and Xtja +X
t
jp +X
t
jr = µj(t), we have
P[X¯(j, Uˆ t)< 1|Xt(j, Uˆ t)≥ µj(t)/3]≤ P[||X¯ −Xt||∞ ≥ µj(t)/3].
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On the other hand, if Uˆ t = p, the error is bounded by
P
[
X¯jp < 1 or X¯ξt−1/2,u < 1
∣∣∣Xtjp ≥ µj(t)3 ,Xtξt−1/2,u ≥ qξt−1/2µj(t)6
]
≤ P
[
||X¯ −Xt||∞ ≥
qξt−1/2µj(t)
6
]
,
where u is the action with largest value between the variables Xt(ξt−1/2,a),Xt(ξt−1/2,r).
Thus, regardless of the action Uˆ t, the probability of choosing a non-satisfying action is bounded
by P[||X¯−Xt||∞ ≥mink qjk ·µj(t)/6]. Moreover, standard LP sensitivity results (Mangasarian and
Shiau 1987, Theorem 2.4) imply that there exists κ depending on q, n,m alone, s.t. ||X¯ −Xt||∞ ≤
κ||Zt − µ(t)||1. Finally, the measure of sets Q where Online chooses a non-satisfying action is
bounded by ∑
t
P[Q(t,St)]≤
∑
t
P[||Zt−µ(t)||1 ≥mink qjk ·µj(t)/6κ]<∞.
The summability follows arguments presented in (Vera and Banerjee 2020), based on standard
concentration bounds. 
5. Dynamic Pricing
We now apply our framework to dynamic pricing. In the basic setting, we have d resources and
n customer types. Each customer type has a private reward for a set of resources. The controller
observes the customer type, and if the corresponding set of resources is available, posts a price.
The customer then purchases iff the requested set is available and the posted price below the
private reward. The resource consumption is encoded in a matrix A∈ {0,1}d×n. In Section 5.5, we
generalize to settings where rather than requesting a specific set of products, customers make a
choice between multiple substitute bundles of resources.
We consider the following formal model: at time t, type j ∈ [n] arrives with probability pj, is
seen by the controller, who then posts a price fjl from a set of available prices {fj1, . . . , fjm}. The
customer then draws a private reward Rt ∼ Fj, and a purchase occurs iff Rt > fjl. If the customer
buys, fjl is collected and the inventory decreases by Aj. On the other hand, if the customer does
not buy, the controller collects zero and the inventory remains unchanged.
5.1. Offline Benchmark and Online Policy for Dynamic Pricing
Offline Benchmark: Note that for each customer type j, there are ZTj arrivals, and hence Z
T
j
draws from the distribution Fj. We now define our benchmark by considering Offline to be a
controller that knows the realized histogram of these draws, i.e., for each j, Offline knows the
empirical distribution of the ZTj rewards. Moreover, at the end of each period t, Offline also
observes the realized valuation Rt whether or not there is a sale. Note that Offline does not know
the exact sequence of these rewards, and so is not a full information benchmark. For example, say
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ZT1 = 15 and we reveal that 10 arrivals type-1 have private reward $1 and 5 arrivals type-1 have
private reward $2; now, upon observing a type-1 arrival, Offline concludes that the reward is
$2 with probability 5
15
. Now if the arrival had value $1, then, the next time Offline observes a
type-1, its belief is that the reward is $2 with probability 5
14
.
Formally for each j suppose the prices are ordered fj1 > fj2 > . . . > fjm. Denote ξ
t ∈ [n] to be the
type of the arrival at time t. To define Offline, we introduce a sequence of independent random
vectors {Y t : t= T,T − 1, . . . ,1} where Y tjl := 1{ξt=j,Rt>fjl}; in other words, Y tjl is the indicator of
whether a price fjl or lower is accepted by the type-j at time t. We define Qjl(t) :=
1
Ztj
∑t
τ=1 Y
τ
jl to
be the fraction of type-j customers who accept price fjl in the last t periods. Observe that Qjl(t)
is a martingale with E[Qjl(t)] = F¯j(fjl) and Qjl(t) =
Zt+1j
Ztj
Qjl(t+ 1)− 1Ztj Y
t+1
jl .
Offline’s information is now given by the filtration Gt = σ({Q(τ),Zτ : τ ≥ t}), i.e., at every time
t, Offline knows the total demand Ztj and the empirical averages Qjl(t), but not the sequence
of rewards. This coincides with the canonical filtration (Definition 1) with variables (Qjl(T ),Z
T
j :
j ∈ [n], l ∈ [m]). The filtration G is strictly coarser than the full information filtration, which would
correspond to revealing all the variables Y T , Y T−1, . . . , Y 1 instead of their empirical averages.
Relaxed Value Function: Consider the following LP, parameterized by (b,q,z).
(P [b,q,z]) maximize:
∑
j,l
fjlqjlxjl (10)
subject to:
∑
j,l
aijqjlxjl ≤ bi ∀ i∈ [d]∑
j,l
xjl +xjr = zj ∀ j ∈ [n]
x≥ 0
We define the relaxed value as ϕ(t,b|Gt) := P [b,Q(t),Zt], and the corresponding estimated value
as ϕˆ(t,b) := P [b,q, tp], where qjl = F¯j(fjl). The resulting rabbi policy is presented in Algorithm 3.
Algorithm 3 Pricing rabbi
Input: Access to solutions of (P [b,q,z])
Output: Sequence of decisions for Online.
1: Set BT ←B as the given initial budget and qjl← F¯j(fjl)
2: for t= T, ...,1 do
3: If the arrival is type j and Aj 6≤Bt: not enough resources, reject and go to t− 1
4: Compute Xt, an optimal solution to (P [Bt,q, tp])
5: Let l ∈ argmax{Xtj,l : l= 1, . . . ,m,r}. If l= r, reject and go to t− 1. Else post price fjl
6: If Rt > fjl, collect fjl and B
t−1←Bt−Aj; else Bt−1←Bt
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To get some intuition into the LP (P [b,q,z]), note that if qjl = F¯j(fjl), i.e., the probability that
price fjl is accepted by a type-j customer and zj is the number of type-j arrivals, then (P [b,q,z])
can be interpreted as follows: the variable xjl represents the number of times that price fjl is
offered, with
∑
j,l fjlqjlxjl the expected reward from the corresponding arrivals. Each time price
fjl is offered, aijqjl units of resource i are consumed in expectation, and hence
∑
j,l aijqjlxjl is the
total expected consumption of resource i. Finally, at most one price is offered per arrival, which is
captured by
∑
l xjl +xjr = zj, where xjr is the number of rejected type-j customers.
5.2. Bellman Inequalities and Bellman Loss
We first argue that our choice of ϕ satisfies the Bellman Inequalities.
Lemma 4. Let V (T,B|GT ) be the value of Offline’s optimal policy, and ϕ(t,b|Gt) = P [b,Q(t),Zt]
be the relaxed value with optimal solution X.
1. E[V (T,B|GT )]≤E[ϕ(T,B|GT )], hence ϕ satisfies the initial ordering condition.
2. If the arriving type is j and maxl{Xjl} ≥ 1, then E[LB(t,b)]≤ 0.
3. If the arriving type is j and Xjl ≥ 1, then posting fjl is a satisfying action.
We omit the proof of the initial ordering in item (1), as it is similar to that of Lemma 2. Below we
present the main ingredients for obtaining the monotonicity property (items (2) and (3)); complete
details are deferred to Appendix C. For ease of exposition, when the controller rejects, he can
equivalently post fjr =∞ such that F¯j(fjr) = 0 with the convention 0×∞= 0.
We start by recalling the monotonicity condition (Definition 2). Denote Et[·] = E[·|Gt]. If the
inventory is b ≥ Aj, the random reward of posting price fjl at t is fjlY tjl and the random new
inventory is b−AjY tjl, thus monotonicity corresponds to:
ϕ(t+ 1,b)≤ max
l∈[m]∪{r}
{Et+1[fjlY t+1jl +ϕ(t,b−AjY t+1jl )]}+Et+1[LB(t+ 1,b)].
Because Q is a martingale, we have Et[Y t] =Q(t) and we can further simplify the condition to
ϕ(t+ 1,b)≤ max
l∈[m]∪{r}
{fjlQjl(t+ 1) +Et+1[ϕ(t,b−AjY t+1jl )]}+Et+1[LB(t+ 1, b)]. (11)
Define LB(t+ 1, b, j, l) := ϕ(t+ 1,b)− fjlQjl(t+ 1)−Et+1[ϕ(t,b−AjY t+1jl )], which corresponds
to the loss in Eq. (11) when we assume a specific price fjl is posted. Recall we define ϕ(t+ 1,b) =
P [b,Q(t+ 1),Zt+1]. Moreover, for an arrival of type j and any solution X of P [b,Q(t+ 1),Zt+1],
if Xjl ≥ 1, then using Lemma 1, we have P [b,Q(t + 1),Zt+1] = fjlQjl(t + 1) + P [b − AjQjl(t +
1),Q(t+ 1),Zt]. Thus, assuming Xjl ≥ 1, we can write the loss in the Bellman inequality as
LB(t+ 1,b, j, l) = P [b−AjQjl(t+ 1),Q(t+ 1),Zt]−Et+1[P [b−AjY t+1jl ,Q(t),Zt]] (12)
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Figure 4 Solution to the pricing LP in Eq. (10) for the case d= 1 and n= 1, which correspond to selling multiple
copies of an item to homogeneous customers. If b/t ∈ (ql, ql+1], the prices used by the LP are fl, fl+1
and the amount of time we offer each is piece-wise linear in the budget. For a perturbation q˜ of q, we
superpose the solutions with the different parameters. Our ‘guess’ is incorrect only when x˜l 1 and
xl < 1, which necessitates a substantial perturbation of q.
Observe that LB(t,b, j, l) is characterized by a random LP that depends on Y
t+1 (which is
unknown at time t+ 1), see Eq. (12). To complete item (2) of Lemma 4, it remains to prove that
LB(t,b, j, l) characterized in (12) satisfies Et[LB(t,b, j, l)] ≤ 0. This is proved in Appendix C by
arguing that the term in (12) is upper bounded by a zero-mean random variable.
We can then conclude that, for each l with Xjl ≥ 1, Et+1[LB(t+1, b, j, l)]≤ 0 so that ϕ(t+1,b)≤
Et+1[fjlQjl(t+ 1) +ϕ(t,b−AjY t+1jl )], implying that posting price fjl is a satisfying action, which
is item (3) of Lemma 4.
5.3. Information Loss and Overall Performance Guarantee
Next we study the disagreement sets Q(t,Bt), and bound the information loss ∑t P[Q(t,Bt)].
Proposition 2. Let X be a solution of (P [b,Q(t),Zt]). If Xjl ≥ 1, then posting fjl is a satisfying
action. Furthermore, the information loss is bounded by P[Q(t,Bt)] ≤ 1/t2 for all t ≥ c, where c
depends only on (f ,p,A,F1, . . . ,Fn).
We now give an outline of this proof; for details, refer Appendix C. Recall that rabbi chooses l
as the maximum entry of the solution to (P [b,E[Q(t)],E[Zt]), which is a perturbed version of the
object of interest, thus Online needs to guess l such that Xjl ≥ 1 without the knowledge of Q(t)
and Zt, creating an information loss.
To build intuition, consider the case where d= 1 and n= 1, i.e., selling multiple copies of an item
to homogeneous customers; since there is only one type, we drop the index j. Recall f1 > . . . > fm
and q1 < . . . < qm. It is easy to check that the solution of P [b,q, t] is as follows: (i) If b≤ tq1, then
x= (b/q1,0, . . . ,0); (ii) If b > tqm, then x= (0, . . . ,0, t); (iii) Otherwise, if b∈ (tql, tql+1], then xl′ = 0
for l′ 6= l, l + 1, and xl = (tql+1 − b)(ql+1 − ql), xl+1 = (b − tql)(ql+1 − ql). Figure 4 illustrates this
solution, and also shows that for rabbi’s guess to be incorrect, Q(t) and E[Q(t)] must deviate
considerably; the next lemma indicates is unlikely. This intuition carries over to higher dimensions.
23
Lemma 5. For any j ∈ [n], there is a constant cj depending on pj only such that, for any time t,
P
[
maxl|Qjl(t)−E[Qjl(t)]|>
√
log(t)
t
]
≤ cj
t2
.
Proof. From the DKW inequality (Massart 1990) for empirical measures, we have
P
[
sup
l
|Qjl(t)− F¯ (fjl)|>λ
∣∣∣Zt]≤ 2e−2λ2Ztj .
Also for Ztj ∼Bin(t, pj), E[e−θZ
t
j ] = (1− p+ pe−θ)t. Setting λ=√log(t)/t, we get
P
[
sup
l
|Qjl(t)− F¯ (fjl)|>
√
log(t)
t
]
≤ 2(1− pj + pje−θ)t where θ= 2 log(t)/t.
Using the inequality e−θ ≤ 1− θ+ θ2/2, an algebraic check confirms the desired inequality. 
Stability of Left-Hand Side Perturbations. As stated in Algorithm 3, Online takes actions
based on P [b,E[Q(t)],E[Zt]], while Offline uses P [b,Q(t),Zt]. Therefore, for fixed (t,b), we need
to compare solutions of P [b,q,z] to those of P [b,q + ∆q,z + ∆z], where ∆ is the perturbation.
Define q =E[Q(t)], z =E[Zt], ∆q =Q(t)−E[Q(t)], and ∆z =Zt−E[Zt].
Lemma 6 (Selection Program). Let Vt = P [b,q+∆q,z+∆z] and fix a component (j
′, l′). Then
posting price fj′l′ is satisfying if PS[Vt,q + ∆q,z + ∆z]≥ 1, where
PS[Vt,q + ∆q,z + ∆z] := max
{
xj′l′ :
∑
j,l
fjl(qjl + ∆qjl)xjl ≥ Vt,x feasible for P [b,q + ∆q,z + ∆z]
}
.
In other words, Q(t, b, l) = {ω ∈Ω : PS[Vt[ω],Q(t),Zt]< 1}.
Proof. This problem selects, among all the solutions of P [b,q+ ∆q,z+ ∆z], one with the largest
component Xj′l′ . From Lemma 4 we know that, if Xj′l′ ≥ 1, then posting fj′l′ is satisfying. 
We have converted the condition “∃X solving P [v,q + ∆q,z + ∆z] with Xj′l′ ≥ 1” to an opti-
mization program. Let x¯ be the solution to the proxy P [b,q,z] and let vt be the objective value
(recall that Vt is the value of P [b,q + ∆q,z + ∆z]). Since the algorithm picks the price with the
largest component, assume x¯j′l′ = maxl x¯j′l 1. In particular, PS[vt,q,z] 1 for this fixed (j′, l′).
We want to show that PS[Vt,q+∆q,z+∆z]≥ 1 for that particular (j′, l′). To that end, we need to
bound the difference between PS[Vt,q+ ∆q,z+ ∆z] and PS[vt,q,z]. This difference depends on (i)
vt−Vt, (ii) ∆, and (iii) the dual variables of (PS[Vt,q + ∆q,z + ∆z]). Observe that the quantities
(i)-(iii) are random. We state the result below; the proof is provided in Appendix C.
Lemma 7. There is a constant c that depends only on (f ,p,A,F1, . . . ,Fn) such that, for all t≥ c,
with probability 1− c/t2, PS[Vt,Q(t),Zt]−PS[vt,E[Q(t)],E[Zt]]≥−c
√
t log(t) .
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Lemma 7 leads to the bound in Proposition 2. Indeed, since the LP in Eq. (10) has the constraint∑
l∈[m]∪{r} x¯jl = tpj, the maximum entry is guaranteed to have a value of at least tpj/(m + 1).
Therefore, by definition of the selection program, PS[vt,E[Q(t)],E[Zt]]≥ tpj/(m+1). We know that
posting fjl′ is satisfying whenever PS[Vt,Q(t),Z
t]≥ 1 (see Lemma 6), hence posting the maximum
entry is satisfying provided that tpj/(m+ 1)− c
√
t log(t)≥ 1, which holds for all t large enough.
5.4. Numerical Simulations
We test our algorithm on two systems, henceforth the “small system” and the “large system”. For
each system, we consider a sequence of instances with increasing horizons and initial inventories.
The small system corresponds to the one-dimensional problem (n = 1 and d = 1); in this case
we can solve the DP for small enough horizons and directly compute the optimality gap. The
large system corresponds to a multi-dimensional problem with n= 20, d= 25 and m= 3. The DP
solution is intractable for the large system, yet we can compute the offline benchmark and compare
our algorithm against it. The optimality gap, recall, is bounded by the offline vs. rabbi gap.
For the small system, the k-th instance has budget B = 6k and horizon T = 20k. For each
scaling k, we run 100,000 simulations. We consider the following primitives: prices are (1,2,3) and
the private reward Rt has an atomic distribution on (1,2,3) with probabilities (0.3,0.4,0.3). The
instance is chosen such that it is dual degenerate for (10) which is supposedly the more difficult
case Jasin (2014). For large system, the parameters were generated randomly and are reported in
Appendix F, the k-th instance has horizon T = 100k and budgets Bi = 10k for all i∈ [25].
For the small system we consider k small enough (short horizon) so that we can compute the
optimal policy; this computation becomes intractable already for moderate values of k (rabbi
however scales gracefully with k as it only requires re-solving an LP in each period). In Fig. 5
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Figure 5 Regret in the ‘small system’ (n= 1 and d= 1), with horizon T = 20k and initial budget B = 6k, under
scaling k= 1,10,20, . . . ,340. Dotted lines represent 90% CI. (LEFT) additive gaps against the optimal
policy, i.e., V DP −V rabbi and V DP −V Offline (RIGHT) Regret of two policies against Offline.
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Figure 6 Performance in the ‘large system’ (n= 20 and d= 25) with horizon T = 100k and initial budgets Bi =
10k for i∈ [25], under scaling k= 1,2, . . . ,1000. (LEFT) Regret against Offline, i.e., V Offline−V rabbi;
dotted lines represent 90% CI. (RIGHT) Approximation factors V rabbi/V Offline of rabbi compared to
Offline, and V Offline/V Full-Info of Offline against the full-information benchmark; this shows that
the full-information benchmark is indeed too loose, as it is Ω(T ) away from the DP.
(LEFT) we display the gap between the optimal solution and both the rabbi and Offline’s value.
We make two observations: (i) the Offline benchmark outperforms the optimal (as it should),
but by a rather small margin, and (ii) rabbi has a constant regret (i.e., independent of k) relative
to Offline, and hence constant optimality gap. In contrast, a full information benchmark would
outperform the optimal by too much to be useful.
In Fig. 5 (RIGHT), we compare rabbi to the optimal static pricing policy which has regret
Ω(
√
k) (Gallego and Van Ryzin 1997). In particular, if D(f) denotes the demand at fare f , we
choose the static price to be the one that maximizes the revenue function f ·D(f) = f · T · F¯ (f)
subject to the constraint D(f)≤B. The solution is the better of two prices: (i) the market clearing
price, i.e., that satisfies D(f) = B or (ii) the monopoly price which maximizes fD(f). We note
though that when a continuum of prices are allowed, (Jasin 2014) propose an algorithm (that,
like rabbi, is based on resolving an optimization problem in each period) which achieves a regret
that is logarithmic in k under certain non-degeneracy assumptions on the optimization problem
and differentiability assumptions on the valuation distribution. In contrast, our constant regret
guarantees hold under a finite price menu.
In Figure 6 we display the results for the large system. Here, since the DP is intractable, we
use the offline benchmark. The resulting regret is negligible relative to the total value as captured
by the approximation-factor on the right-hand side of the figure. We also present the competitive
ratio of Offline against the full-information benchmark (this upper bounds the competitive ratio
of any non-anticipatory policy) and observe that is bounded away from 1, hence showing that the
full-information benchmark is Ω(T ) away from the DP in our randomly generated instance, which
confirms the need for our refined benchmark.
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5.5. Posted Pricing With Customer Choice
We now consider settings where customers, rather than requesting a specific product, make a choice
between multiple substitutes. As a concrete example, consider a hardware store selling washers and
dryers; the store can set a separate price for a washer, a dryer, and also for buying a washer-and-
dryer bundle (i.e., one of each). An incoming customer sees the prices and chooses to buy each of the
three options (or nothing at all) with some probability depending on the price menu. See (Talluri
and Van Ryzin 2006, Chapter 7) for details on such customer-choice models. For exposition, we
focus here on a single-customer-type, with arbitrary (but known) customer-choice model.
As before, the controller chooses a price to post for each product and selling one unit of product
j ∈ [n] depletes resources according to Aj ∈ {0,1}d. There is a discrete set of “assortment menus”,
denoted by A. An assortment α∈A is associated with a vector of prices (f1α, . . . , fnα), one price per
product. Setting fjα =∞ corresponds to not offering product j. Note that if each product’s price is
restricted to take one of m distinct values, then there are at most |A| ≤mn different assortments.
The actual number of relevant assortments might, however, be much smaller than this.
An arriving customer, when offered assortment α, chooses to buy product j with a probability
pj(α), with
∑n
j=0 pj(α) = 1 (where we use j = 0 for the no-purchase option). These probabilities
might be derived, for example, from a standard family such as the multinomial-logit model, nested
logit model, etc.; our results do not need any specific structure on the choice probabilities (although
assuming more structure may lead to better regret scaling with respect to the number of price
menus and more efficient ways of solving the resulting LP relaxation).
The process unfolds as follows: (i) at time t the controller posts an assortment α ∈A; (ii) with
probability pj(α), the arriving customer buys one unit of product j (with product 0 corresponding
to no-purchase). Now given the choice probabilities, we can simulate the choice model as follows:
we assume w.l.o.g. that the customer arriving at time t is endowed with an i.i.d random variable
ξt ∼Uniform(0,1), and assert that the customer buys product j if ξt ∈ [∑j−1j′=0 pj′(α),∑jj′=0 pj′(α)].
Note that the order of products here is arbitrary.
Applying rabbi to this setting gives the following result.
Theorem 6 (Dynamic Pricing with Customer Choice). For any choice model with proba-
bilities and prices (pj(α), fjα : j ∈ [n], α∈A), rabbi obtains a regret that depends only on (A,p, f),
but is independent of the horizon length T and initial budget levels B ∈Nd.
Algorithm and Analysis: The following LP extends Eq. (10) to incorporate consumer choice.
(P [b,q,z]) maximize:
∑
α∈A
xα
∑
j∈[n]
fjαqjα (13)
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subject to:
∑
α∈A
∑
j∈[n]
aijqjαxα ≤ bi ∀ i∈ [d]∑
α∈A
xα = t
x≥ 0
Here qjα stands for the fraction of customers that would buy product j if presented with the
price assortment α. rabbi re-solves, in each period, this LP with the expected fraction qjα = pj(α).
In contrast, Offline knows Qjα(t), the realized fraction of customers that, given assortment α,
would buy product j (formally, Offline is equipped with the canonical augmented filtration with
variables (Qjα(T ) : j ∈ [n], α∈A)), and solves Eq. (13) with qjα =Qjα(t), where :
Qjα(t) :=
1
t
t∑
τ=1
Y tjα where Y
t
jα := 1
{∑j−1
j′=0 pj′ (α)≤ξt≤
∑j
j′=0 pj′ (α)
}.
With the (re)defined key ingredients—namely the LP in Eq. (13) and Offline’s information
structure—it is evident that that the analysis of this expanded model is identical to that of the
basic (no-choice) pricing setting with obvious changes. For example, if assortment α is posted at
time t, the random collected reward is
∑
j Y
t
jαfjα and the random inventory at t−1 is b−
∑
jAjY
t
jα.
In turn, the Bellman loss in Eq. (12) takes on the form
LB(t+ 1,b, α) = P [b−
∑
j
AjQjα(t+ 1),Q(t+ 1), t]−Et+1[P [b−
∑
j
AjY
t+1
jα ,Q(t), t]] (14)
Now we have a sum over products j, but the analysis goes through via linearity of expectations.
Numerical Simulations: We demonstrate our algorithm for the following simple choice-model
with two resources (R1,R2), and three products ({R1},{R2},{R1,R2}) (for example, a hardware
store selling washers (R1), dryers (R2) or washer-and-dryer combos {R1,R2}). The controller has
initial inventories of each resource, and can choose among one of 7 price assortments: high and low
prices with/without discounts for buying the bundle, and price menus assuming stock-out of either
or both resource. The price menus and choice probabilities are detailed in Table 1. We run rabbi
for this instance while scaling the horizon and initial inventory; see Fig. 7.
Products High High-discount Low Low-discount Only R2 Only R1 Stock-out
fjα
{R1} 5 5 3 3 ∞ 5 Out
{R2} 5 5 3 3 5 ∞ ∞
{R1,R2} 10 9 6 5 ∞ ∞ ∞
pj(α)
{R1} 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3 0 0.2 0
{R2} 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.2 0 0
{R1,R2} 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25 0 0 0
Table 1 Example with seven assortments: We consider high/low prices with and without bundling discount (i.e.,
buying {R1,R2} is cheaper than buying each individually). The other assortments can be used if items sell out.
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Figure 7 Performance of pricing-rabbi with customer choice (see Table 1). We set the horizon as T = 10k and
the inventory as (R1,R2) = (3k,2k), and vary scaling parameter k= 1, . . . ,1000. (LEFT) Regret against
Offline, with 90% confidence intervals. (RIGHT) Approximation ratio of rabbi against DP.
6. Online Knapsack With Distribution Learning
Finally we consider the distribution-agnostic online knapsack setting. We study first the full feed-
back setting and in Section 6.3 extend to censored feedback. As in the baseline OnlineKnapsack,
at each time t, the arrival is of type j ∈ [n] with known probability pj. Type j has a known weight
wj and random reward Rj, drawn from a distribution Fj with rj :=E[Rj]. Critically, we assume rj
and Fj are unknown to Online.
The reward Rj is revealed only after the decision of accept/reject has been made. At the end of
each period, we observe the realization of both accepted and rejected items. In contrast, Offline
has access to the distribution Fj, but not to the realizations. We assume that, before the process
starts, we are given one sample of each type, and with t periods to go, define Rtj to be the empirical
average of the observed rewards for type-j arrivals.
As in probing, we divide each period t ∈ {T,T − 1, . . . ,1} into two stages, t and t− 1/2. In the
first stage (i.e., period t) the input reveals the type j ∈ [n], and in second stages (i.e., period t−1/2)
the reward is revealed. The random inputs are given by ξt ∈ [n] and ξt−1/2 ∈R. The state space is
S =R≥0×{∅,a,r}, where the first component is the remaining knapsack capacity. At a first stage,
given a state of the form s= (b,∅), we choose action  ∈ {a,r}, reducing the capacity if = a. At
the second stage, the state is of the form s= (b,) with  ∈ {a,r}, and we collect the reward only
if = a. Formally, the rewards are R((b,a), ξt−1/2,∅) = ξt−1/2 and R((b,r), ξt−1/2,∅) = 0.
6.1. Offline Benchmark and Online Policy for Distribution-Agnostic Online Knapsack
To define Offline, ϕ and ϕˆ, consider the following LP parametrized by (b,y,z)∈R≥0×Rn×Rn≥0
(P [b,y,z]) maximize:
∑
j
yjxj (15)
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subject to:
∑
j
wjxja ≤ b
xja +xjr = zj ∀ j ∈ [n]
x≥ 0
Note that if the average rewards r were known, then setting y = r we get the LP relaxation of
Eq. (1) for the baseline OnlineKnapsack. Moreover, for any r, the optimal LP solution sorts types
by their “bang for the buck” ratios rj/wj, and accepts them greedily. In particular, the solution
only requires knowing the ranking induced by r.
Offline Benchmark and Relaxed Value Function: In this setting, we define Offline as the
controller that knows the number of arrivals ZTj for each j, and also, knows the ranking of the types
(i.e., knows rj/wj ∀ j ∈ [n]).
Formally, Offline is defined via the filtration Gt = σ({ξt : t ∈ [T ]} ∪ {ξτ : τ ≥ t}). This is a
canonical filtration (see Definition 1) with variables (Gθ : θ ∈Θ) = (ξt : t ∈ [T ]). Observe that the
future rewards, corresponding to times t− 1/2, are not revealed. Moreover, the relaxed value is
defined as ϕ(t, s|Gt) = P [b,r,Zt] for first stages and
ϕ(t− 1/2, s|Gt) =
{
P [b,r,Zt−1] = r
ξt−1/2 +P [b,r,Zt−1] = a. (16)
Remark 3 (MDP relaxations for distribution-agnostic settings). We note here that
the underlying problem in this setting does not directly admit an MDP, as the distribution of
rewards is unknown. However, once we reveal the arrivals to Offline, the relaxation does admit a
well-defined MDP. By benchmarking against Offline, we bypass the need to explicitly formulate
an Online control problem with distribution learning in this setting.
Value Function estimate and Online Policy: Recall we define Rtj to be the empirical average
of the observed rewards for type-j with t periods to go. We define the estimated value as ϕˆ =
P [Bt,Rt,E[Zt]], resulting in the corresponding online policy given in Algorithm 4.
6.2. Regret Analysis for Distribution-Agnostic Online Knapsack
As in the earlier sections, we first demonstrate that ϕ satisfies the Bellman inequalities
Lemma 8. The relaxation ϕ defined in (16) satisfies the Bellman Inequalities with exclusion sets
B(t, b) = {ω ∈Ω :6 ∃X solving (P [b,r,Zt]) s.t. Xξt,a ≥ 1 or Xξt,r ≥ 1}.
Proof. The initial ordering in Definition 2 follows from an argument identical to that of Lemma 2.
The monotonicity property follows from Proposition 3. 
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Algorithm 4 Learning rabbi
Input: Access to solutions of (P [b,y,z])
Output: Sequence of decisions for Online.
1: Set BT ←B as the given initial state and RT as the single sample of each j.
2: for t∈ {T,T − 1, . . . ,1} do
3: Compute Xt, an optimal solution to (P [Bt,Rt,E[Zt]]).
4: Observe the arrival type (context), say ξt = j, and take any action Uˆ t ∈ argmaxu=a,r{Xtju}
5: If Uˆ t = a, collect random reward Rj and reduce the budget B
t−1←Bt−wj. Else, Bt−1←Bt.
6: Update empirical averages Rt−1 based on Rt and the observation Rj.
To complete the proof of Theorem 4, we need to characterize the information loss under Algo-
rithm 4. The relaxation relies on the knowledge of r (the true expectation) and Zt. The natural
estimators are the empirical averages Rt and expectation µ(t) = E[Zt], respectively. Specifically,
we use maximizers Xt of (P [b,Rt, µ(t)]) to “guess” those of (P [b,r,Zt]).
The overall regret bound is rϕ(Regret1 +Regret2), where Regret1 and Regret2 are two specific
sources of error. When the estimators Rt of r are accurate enough, the error is Regret1 and is
attributed to the incorrect “guess” of a satisfying action, i.e., Regret1 is an algorithmic regret. The
second term, Regret2, is the error that arises from insufficient accuracy of R
t, i.e., Regret2 is the
learning regret. The maximum loss satisfies rϕ ≤maxj,i{wirj/wj − ri} and we can show that
Regret1 ≤ 2
∑
j
(wmax/wj)
2
pj
and Regret2 ≤ 16
∑
j
1
pj(wjδ)2
.
In sum, the regret is bounded by (maxj,i{wirj/wj − ri}) · (2
∑
j
(wmax/wj)
2
pj
+ 16
∑
j
1
pj(wjδ)
2 ).
Remark 4 (non-i.i.d arrival processes). We used the i.i.d. arrival structure to bound two
quantities in the proof of Theorem 4: (1) P[||Zt−E[Zt]|| ≥ cE[Zt]] and (2) E[e−cNtj ], where, recall,
N tj is the number of type-j observations. The result holds for other arrival processes that admit
these tail bounds.
6.3. Censored Feedback
We consider now the case where only accepted arrivals reveal their reward. We retain the assump-
tion of Theorem 4 that there is a separation δ > 0: |r¯j − r¯j′ | ≥ δ for all j 6= j′, where r¯j =E[Rj]/wj.
In the absence of full feedback, we will introduce a unified approach to obtaining the optimal
regret (up to constant factors), that takes the learning method is a plug-in. The learning algorithm
will decide between explore or exploit actions. Examples of learning algorithms, that also give
bounds that are explicit in t, include modifications of UCB (Wu et al. 2015), ε-Greedy or simply
to set apart some time for exploration (see Corollary 1 below).
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Recall that σ : [n]→ [n] is the ordering of [n] w.r.t. the ratios r¯j = rj/wj and σˆt : [n]→ [n] is the
ordering w.r.t. ratios R¯tj =R
t
j/wj. The discrepancy P[σ 6= σˆt] depends on the plug-in learning algo-
rithm (henceforth Bandits). Bandits receives as inputs the current state St (remaining capacity),
time, and the natural filtration Ft. The output of Bandits is an action in {explore,exploit}. If
the action is explore, we accept the current arrival in order to gather information, otherwise we
call our algorithm to decide, as summarized in Algorithm 5. Note that Ft has information only on
the observed rewards, i.e., accepted items.
Algorithm 5 Bandits rabbi
Input: Access to Bandits and Algorithm 4.
Output: Sequence of decisions for Online.
1: Set ST as the given initial state
2: for t= T, . . . ,1 do
3: Observe input ξt and let U ←Bandits(T, t,St,Ft).
4: If U = explore, accept the arrival
5: If U = exploit, take the action given by Algorithm 4
6: Update state St−1← St−wξt if accept or St−1← St if reject.
Theorem 7. Let Regret1 be the regret of Algorithm 4, as given in Theorem 4. Define the indicators
exploret,exploitt which denote the output of Bandits at time t. The regret of Algorithm 5 is at
most rϕM , where
M = Regret1 +E
[∑
t
exploret
]
+E
[∑
t
P[σ 6= σˆt]exploitt
]
.
The expected regret of Algorithm 5 is thus bounded by the regret of Algorithm 4 in the full
feedback setting, plus a quantity controlled by Bandits. In the periods where Bandits says
explore (which, in particular, implies accepting the item), the decision might be the wrong one
(i.e., different than Offline’s). We upper bound this by the number of exploration periods. This is
the second term in M . The decision might also be wrong if Bandits says exploit (in which case
we call Algorithm 4), but the (learned) ranking at time t, σˆt, is different than σt. This is the last
term in M . Finally, even if the learned ranking is correct, exploit can lead to the wrong “guess”
by Algorithm 4 because the arrival process is uncertain. This is the first term in M .
Corollary 1 uses a naive Bandits which explores until obtaining Ω(logT ) samples and achieves
the optimal (i.e., logarithmic) regret scaling. The constants may be improved by changing the
Bandits module we use; any such algorithm has the guarantee given by Theorem 7. With the naive
Bandits, the bound follows from a generalization of coupon collector (Shank and Yang 2013).
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Corollary 1. If we first obtain 8
(wjδ)
2 logT samples of every type j, then we can obtain O(logT )
regret, which is optimal up to constant factors.
7. Concluding Remarks
We developed a framework that provides rigorous support to the use of simple optimization prob-
lems as a basis for online re-solving algorithms. The framework is based on using a carefully chosen
offline benchmark, that guides the online algorithm. The regret bounds then follow from our use
of Bellman Inequalities and a useful distinction between Bellman Loss and Information Loss.
As is often the case in approximate dynamic programming, the identification of a function ϕ
satisfying the Bellman Inequalities requires some ad-hoc creativity but, as our example illustrate,
is often rather intuitive. In Appendix A we provide sufficient conditions, applicable to cases where
ϕ has a natural linear representation, to verify the Bellman inequalities. These conditions are
intuitive and likely to hold for a variety of resource allocation problems. Importantly, once such
a function is identified, our rabbi framework provides a way of obtaining online policies from ϕ,
and corresponding regret bounds.
We illustrate our framework on three settings. First we consider online probing, which serves as
an instance of a larger family of two-stage decision problems, wherein there is an inherent trade-off
between getting refined information, and the cost of obtaining it. Next we consider dynamic pricing,
which is a well-studied problem, and is representative of settings where rewards and transitions are
random. Finally, our study of online contextual bandits with knapsacks showcases a separation of
the underlying combinatorial problem from the parameter estimation problem.
It is our hope that this structured framework will be useful in developing online algorithms for
other problems, whether these are extensions of those we studied here or completely different.
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Appendix A: A Sufficient Condition for Bellman Inequalities
In this section, we construct ϕ based on a general optimization program and provide a sufficient
condition to guarantee monotonicity. This serves to underscore some of the key elements in a
problem’s structure that allows one to construct low regret online policies. This guideline does
not apply to all the examples we study here: in particular, it applies to the baseline and learning
variants, but not to probing or pricing.
We study a particular case of canonical filtrations (see Definition 1), where the random variables
Gθ that we reveal are the inputs ξ
θ for some fixed times Θ (see Fig. 2 for an illustration).
Recall that we reveal some inputs to Offline, but not necessarily all of them; we call concealed
inputs those not revealed to Offline. Informally speaking, we will show that ϕ satisfies the
Bellman Inequalities if (i) Offline’s relaxed value ϕ can be computed with a linear program and
(ii) the concealed inputs are in the objective function only (not in the constraints). Requirements
(i) and (ii) are appealing because they are verifiable directly from the problem structure without
any computation.
Recall that, with t periods to go, Offline knows the randomness {ξT , . . . , ξt, ξΘ}, where we
denote ξΘ = (ξ
θ : θ ∈Θ). In other words, we reveal {ξT , . . . , ξt, ξΘ}, while the inputs {ξl : l < t, l /∈Θ}
are concealed.
Suppose the relaxation is an LP with decision variables x (see Eq. (5)):
ϕ(t, s|Gt) = max
x∈RΞ×[T ]×U
{E[h(x; ξ1, . . . , ξT )|Gt] : g(x;s, ξT , . . . , ξt, ξΘ)≥ 0}, (17)
where U ,Ξ are the control and input spaces. For input ξ, control u, and time t, we interpret xξ,t,u
as a variable indicating if Offline uses u at time t when presented input ξ.
Proposition 3. Let h, g be linear functions and let ϕ be given by (17). Assume further that the
following holds for all s, t, u
(i) h captures rewards: E[h(eξt,t,u; ξ1, . . . , ξT )|Gt] ≤ R(s, ξt, u) for actions u that are feasible in
state s.
(ii) g captures transitions: g(eξt,t,u;s, ξ
T , . . . , ξt, ξΘ)≤ g(0;T (s, ξt, u), ξT , . . . , ξt−1, ξΘ).
Then, ϕ satisfies monotonicity with exclusion sets
B(t, s) = {ω ∈Ω :6 ∃X[ω] solving ϕ(t, s|Gt) s.t. Xξt,t,u ≥ 1 for some u∈ U}.
It is natural to say that h captures the reward if the incremental effect of taking the action u
given input ξt is equal to the immediate reward E[h(eξt,t,u; ξ1, . . . , ξT )|Gt] =R(s, ξt, u). It is similarly
natural to say that g captures transitions if it is stable under the one-step transition, namely, that
g(eξt,t,u;s, ξ
T , . . . , ξt, ξΘ) = g(0;T (s, ξt, u), ξT , . . . , ξt−1, ξΘ); in other words, this means that taking
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the action u at time t, has the same effect as taking no action at the state T (s, ξt, u). This should
hold in any reasonable resource consumption problem, e.g., consuming 1 with B units of budget
remaining is the same as not consuming anything with B − 1 units. In the result below we make
the weaker assumption that these relationships hold as inequalities.
The baseline and learning variants are useful illustrations of Proposition 3.
Example 3 (Baseline). Let G be the full information filtration (Θ = [T ]). In Section 2.2 we intro-
duced a linear relaxation for Offline. We start by writing a relaxation in the form of Proposition 3
and show how it subsequently simplifies to the final form in Section 2.2.
Recall that a,r denote the actions accept and reject. A natural “expanded” linear program is
max
{∑
j
t∑
l=1
xj,l,arj :
∑
j,l
wjxj,l,a ≤ s,0≤ xj,l,a ≤ 1{ξl=j}
}
.
Defining the auxiliary variables xj :=
∑
l xj,l,a, this is equivalent to ϕ(t, s|G) = max{r′x : w′x ≤
s,0≤ x≤ Zt}, where, recall Ztj =
∑t
l=1 1{ξl=j} counts the number of type-j arrivals in the last t
periods.
This ϕ also has the form of Proposition 3, with the functions h and g given by (note that the
action r has zero objective coefficient)
h(x; ξ1, . . . , ξt) :=
∑
j
xjarj and g(x;s, ξ
T , . . . , ξ1) :=
(
s−∑j xja
Zt−x
)
.
Conditions (i) and (ii) can be easily verified now. The objective h is a linear function of the decision
vector x and the constraint function g aggregates ξ into the sums Zt.
In the learning setting, Offline is presented with a public type j and must decide whether
to accept or reject before seeing the private type, which is a reward Rj drawn from an unknown
distribution.
Example 4 (Learning). Let us model the problem with 2T time periods, where at even times
the public type is revealed and at odd times the private (reward). In this model, the input ξt is an
index j ∈ [n] at even times and it is a reward R ∈R at odd times. Also let us model the random
rewards by drawing i.i.d. copies {Rjt}t of Rj.
Let us endow Offline with the information of all even times, i.e., Offline knows all the future
arriving public types. Specifically, we set Θ = {t∈ [T ] : t is even} (see Fig. 2 for a representation of
G). The realizations {Rjt}j,t, drawn at times t /∈Θ, are concealed. The expanded linear program is
max
{∑
j
t∑
l=1
xj,l,aE[Rj] :
∑
j,l
wjxj,l,a ≤ s,0≤ xj,l,a ≤ 1{ξl=j}
}
.
37
As before, we can simplify this LP by aggregating variables, see Section 6 for the details. Here we
prefer to study the expanded LP because it exemplifies the conditions in Proposition 3.
The objective function is h(x; ξ1, . . . , ξt) =
∑
j,l xj,l,aRj,l, When we take expectations E[·|Gt] we
arrive at the expression
∑
j,l xj,l,aE[Rj]. The constraint function g is given by the feasibility region
of the LP. Conditions (i) and (ii) of Proposition 3 hold with equality.
Proof of Proposition 3. Let u∈ U be such that Xξt,t,u ≥ 1. Denote θt := {l ∈ [T ] : l≥ t}∪Θ,
so all the inputs (ξl : l ∈Θt) are revealed at time t (the rest are concealed). By Lemma 1,
ϕ(t, s|Gt) =E[h(eξt,t,u; ξ1, . . . , ξT )|Gt] + max
x
{E[h(x; ξ1, . . . , ξT )|Gt] : g(x + eξt,t,u;s, (ξl : l ∈Θt))≥ 0}.
Using (i) and (ii) yields
ϕ(t, s|Gt)≤R(s, ξt, u) + max
x
{E[h(x; ξ1, . . . , ξT )|Gt] : g(x;T (s, ξt, u), (ξl : l ∈Θt−1))≥ 0}. (18)
Since Gt is coarser than Gt−1, we know that E[E[·|Gt−1]|Gt] = E[·|Gt]. Using Eq. (18) and applying
Jensen’s Inequality (recall that the maximum of linear functions is a convex function) we obtain
ϕ(t, s|Gt)≤R(s, ξt, u) +E
[
max
x
{E[h(x; ξ1, . . . , ξT )|Gt−1] : g(x;T (s, ξt, u), (ξl : l ∈Θt−1))≥ 0}
∣∣∣Gt].
This corresponds to the required inequality in Definition 2. 
The sufficient conditions in Proposition 3 are not necessary; they are not satisfied in the probing
setting (Section 4) or in the pricing setting (Section 5). Nevertheless, we are still able to show
monotonicity and draw the desired regret bounds.
Appendix B: Additional Details from Section 4 (Online Probing)
We first state and prove an auxiliary lemma which we need for our proofs.
Lemma 9. Consider the standard-form LP (P [d]) : max{r′x :Mx = d,x≥ 0}, where M ∈Rm×n is
an arbitrary constraint matrix and d ∈Rm. The function d 7→ P [d] is concave and therefore, if X
is a random right-hand side, then E[P [X]]≤ P [E[X]].
Proof. The dual problem is (D[d]) : min{d′y :M ′y≥ r}. The function d 7→D[d] is a minimum of
linear functions, therefore concave. 
B.1. Bellman Inequalities and Loss
We first establish the initial ordering property.
Proof of Lemma 2. Consider a policy for Offline determining when to probe, accept or
reject. Recall such a policy is a mapping pi : [T ]×S →U s.t. pi(t, s) is Gt-measurable for all t, s.
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The policy, once fixed, induces a random trajectory determined by the realization of the probed
rewards. Denote the random number of times where a type j was probed as Xjp, accepted (rejected)
without probing as Xja (Xjr), and accepted (rejected) after probe outcome is (j, k) as Xjka (Xjkr).
Then, we can write E[V (T, (bh, bp)|GT )] = E[
∑
j r¯jXja +
∑
j,k rjkXjka|GT ], where we use the fact
that, conditional on accepting without probing, the expected reward is r¯j. Thus we have
E[V (t, (bh, bp)|GT )] =
∑
j
r¯jE[Xja|GT ] +
∑
j,k
rjkE[Xjka|GT ].
We now claim that E[X] yields a feasible solution to (P [T, (bh, bp),Z]). Indeed, with the excep-
tion of the constraint xjka + xjkr = qjkxjp, the random variables satisfy a.s. all the constraints
of (P [T, (bh, bp),Z]). Furthermore, since Offline’s policy is adapted to G, we obtain E[Xjka +
Xjkr|Xjp,GT ] = qjkXjp, thus the expected values satisfy the desired constraint. To summarize,
V (T, (bh, bp)|GT ) equals the value of the feasible solution given by the expectations. 
Next we establish the monotonicity condition in Definition 2.
Proof of Lemma 3. Observe that the monotonicity condition in Definition 2 translates to the
following condition in the online probing setting.
ϕ(t, (bh, bp,∅)|Gt)≤ max∈{a,p,r}{Eξt−1/2 [ϕ(t− 1/2, (s,)|Gt−1/2)|Gt]} ∀ω /∈B(t, s).
where the state s = (bh− 1, bp) if = a, s = (bh, bp− 1) if = p and s = (bh, bp) if = r.
First, given ξt = i, we have from Eq. (8) that Eξt−1/2 [ϕ(t − 1/2, (s,))|Gt−1/2)|Gt] =
P [(bh, bp),Z
t−1] if = r, and rξt−1/2 +P [(bh − 1, bp),Zt−1] if = a. Now for cases (1) and (2), the
claim in the lemma follows directly by invoking Lemma 1.
For case (3) we need to introduce some notation. Let qj ∈ Rn×m be a vector with value qjk in
components (j, k), k ∈ [m], and zero otherwise (i.e. in components (j′, k) with j′ 6= j). Similarly, let
1(j,k) ∈Rn×m have value 1 in the single component (j, k) and zero otherwise. We also rewrite the
LP in Eq. (7) with an extra ‘budget vector’ w such that P [(bh, bp),z] = P¯ [(bh, bp),z,0].
(P¯ [(bh, bp),z,w]) maximize:
∑
j,k
rjkxjka +
∑
j
r¯jxja
subject to:
∑
j,k
xjka +
∑
j
xja ≤ bh∑
j
xjp ≤ bp
xja +xjp +xjr = zj ∀ j ∈ [n]
xjka +xjkr− qjkxjp =wjk ∀ j ∈ [n], k ∈ [m]
x≥ 0
39
Now if X¯ip ≥ 1 and ξt−1/2 = (i, k) is such that either X¯ika ≥ 1 or X¯ikr ≥ 1, then by Lemma 1, we
have the following decomposition (depending on the random ξt−1/2)
P¯ [(bh, bp),Z
t,0] = rξt−1/21{X¯ika≥1}+ P¯ [(bh−1{X¯ika≥1}, bp− 1),Z
t−1,qξt −1ξt−1/2 ], ∀ω /∈B(t, bh, bp)
where the vectors q,1 are evaluated in random components; since by assumption X¯ip ≥ 1 under the
optimal solution, the optimal value in the optimization problem is the same as the reward obtained
“now” (rξt−1/2) and the residual value after discounting bp by one. Taking expectations E[·|Gt] and
using Lemma 9 we have
P [(bh, bp),Z
t] =E[rξt−1/21{X¯ika≥1}+ P¯ [(bh−1{X¯ika≥1}, bp− 1),Z
t−1,qξt −1ξt−1/2 ]|Gt]
≤E[rξt−1/21{X¯ika≥1}+ P¯ [(bh−1{X¯ika≥1}, bp− 1),Z
t−1,0]|Gt]
≤E[max{rξt−1/2 +P [(bh− 1, bp− 1),Zt−1], P [(bh, bp− 1),Zt−1]}|Gt].
The last inequality, following from substituting 1{X¯ika≥1} ∈ {0,1}, gives the desired result. 
Appendix C: Additional Details from Section 5 (Dynamic Pricing)
C.1. Proof of Lemma 4
Throughout this subsection, we fix some indexes j′, l′. To complete the proof of the proposition, it
remains to establish that, whenever Xj′l′ ≥ 1, then E[LB(t+ 1,b, j′, l′)|Gt]≤ 0, where
LB(t+ 1,b, j
′, l′) = P [b−Aj′Qj′l′(t+ 1),Q(t+ 1),Zt]−Et+1[P [b−Aj′Yj′l′ ,Q(t),Zt]].
The Correction LP. Let us fix (t,b,q,z) and denote x¯ the solution of P [b−Aj′qj′l′ ,q,z]. To
bound the loss, we must bound the right-hand side of (12), which captures the perturbation of
budgets from b−Aj′qj′l′ to b−Aj′Yj′l′ and the perturbation of fractions from q to q + ∆, where
∆ is a zero-mean random vector.
Let us re-formulate P [b−Aj′Yj′l′ ,q + ∆,z] based on how much we need to correct x¯:
(P [b−Aj′Yj′l′ ,q + ∆,z]) maxy
∑
j,l fjl(qjl + ∆jl)(x¯jl− yjl)
s.t.
∑
j,l aij(qjl + ∆jl)(x¯jl− yjl) ≤ bi− aij′Yj′l′ ∀i∑
l(x¯jl− yjl) ≤ zj ∀j
x¯−y ≥ 0.
The new formulation uses decision variables y, which may be negative, and correspond to how
much we movement there is from the initial solution x¯ to the new one.
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Let us denote the resource-slack variables of P [b − Aj′qj′l′ ,q,z] by (si ≥ 0 : i ∈ [d]), i.e.,∑
j,l aijqjlx¯jl + si = bi− aij′qj′l′ . Similarly, let us denote the demand-slack variables by (uj ≥ 0 : j ∈
[n]), i.e.,
∑
l x¯jl +uj = zj. Using the slack variables, the problem simplifies to
P [b−Aj′Yj′l′ ,q + ∆,z] =
∑
j,l fjl(qjl + ∆jl)x¯jl−miny
∑
j,l fjl(qjl + ∆jl)yjl
s.t.
∑
j,l aij(qjl + ∆jl)yjl ≥ βi ∀i∑
l yjl ≥−uj ∀j
y ≤ x¯,
(19)
where we defined βi := aij′(Yj′l′ − qj′l′)− si +
∑
j,l aij∆jlx¯jl.
Observe that, since E[∆] = 0, the first term outside the minimization, namely
∑
j,l fjl(qjl +
∆jl)x¯jl, equals
∑
j,l fjlqjlx¯jl = P [b−Aj′qj′l′ ,q,z] in expectation. The following result readily proves
Lemma 4.
Lemma 10 (Correction LP). If we denote q = Q(t + 1), then the Bellman Loss is bounded
by E[LB(t+ 1,b, j′, l′)] ≤ E[PC [Yj′l′ ,q,∆]], where (PC [Yj′l′ ,q,∆]) is the minimization problem in
Eq. (19). Furthermore, E[LB(t+ 1,b, j′, l′)]≤ 0.
Proof. Recall that βi = aij′(Yj′l′ − qj′l′)− si +
∑
j,l aij∆jlx¯jl and observe that E[βi]≤ 0 for all i.
We will find some deterministic values ci such that the objective value of PC [Yj′l′ ,q,∆] is upper
bounded by
∑
i ciβi, which proves the result.
We argue the upper bound on (PC [Yj′l′ ,q,∆]) by bounding the optimal dual solution. The dual
of PC [Yj′l′ ,q,∆] is
max
µ,λ,θ≥0
{
β′µ−u′λ−
∑
j,l
x¯jlθjl : (qjl + ∆jl)A
′
jµ+λj − θjl ≤ fjl(qjl + ∆jl) ∀j, l
}
This problem is the dual of a feasible and finite problem (see Eq. (19)), hence it has an optimal
finite solution and we can bound µi ≤ ci for some deterministic values ci. The objective value of
this maximization problem is upper bounded by β′c, which proves the result. 
C.2. Proof of Lemma 7
Recall that we wish to establish the following: if ϕˆ (used by Online) has a solution with xjl′ =
maxl xjl >> 1, then posting price fjl is a satisfying action. To establish this, it remains to bound
the difference between the LP PS[vt,q,z] and its “perturbed” version PS[Vt,q + ∆q,z + ∆z]. To
that end, we first establish a bound on vt−Vt; see item (i) in the discussion following Lemma 6.
Lemma 11. For fixed b, denote Vt = P [b,Q(t),Z
t] and vt = P [b,E[Q(t)],E[Zt]]. If t≥ c, then, with
probability at least 1− c/t2, we have vt−Vt ≥−c
√
t log(t). The constant c is independent of b and
depends on (f ,F1, . . . ,Fn) only.
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Proof. Set q =Q(t), z = Zt, ∆q = E[Q(t)]−Q(t), and ∆z = E[Zt]−Zt. Take x¯ to be a solution
of Vt and use a correction program analogous to Eq. (19) to conclude
vt = Vt +
∑
j,l fjl∆qjlx¯jl−miny
∑
j,l fjl(qjl + ∆qjl)yjl
s.t.
∑
j,l aij(qjl + ∆qjl)yjl ≥ βi ∀i∑
l yjl + tpj ≥
∑
l x¯jl ∀j
y ≤ x¯,
(20)
where βi =−si +
∑
j,l aij∆qjlx¯jl. We will argue an upper bound on the minimization problem by
exhibiting a feasible solution.
Set g(t) :=
√
log(t)/t and consider the solution yjl = x¯jl
g(t)
qjl+∆qjl
. First recall that, by Lemma 5,
|∆qjl| ≤ g(t) with high probability. The objective value of this solution is
∑
j,l fjlx¯jlg(t), hence from
Eq. (20) we get vt ≥ Vt− 2
∑
j,l fjlg(t)x¯jl. From here, using the fact that x¯ solves an LP with the
constraint
∑
l xjl ≤Ztj for all j and that Ztj ≤ t a.s., we conclude the result by using that x¯jl ≤ t.
We are left to check that our solution y is feasible for the LP in Eq. (20). The first set of
constraints is satisfied because g(t)≥∆qjl. The second set of constraints is satisfied since
∑
l x¯jl ≤
Ztj and Z
t
j ≤ tpj +
√
t log(t) w.h.p. Finally, the constraints y≤ x¯ are satisfied since g(t)≤ qjl+ ∆qjl
for all t large enough. 
Proof of Lemma 7. Let us denote θ= (v,q,z) and θ+ ∆θ= (v+ ∆v,q + ∆q,z + ∆z). Recall
that b and t are fixed throughout. The selection program for a fixed component (j′, l′) is given by
(PS[θ]) max xj′l′
s.t.
∑
j,l fjlqjlxjl ≥ v∑
j,l aijqjlxjl ≤ bi ∀i∑
l xjl ≤ zj ∀j
x ≥ 0.
If X¯ is the solution to P [b,Q(t),Zt] (used by Offline) and x¯ is the solution to
P [b,E[Q(t)],E[Zt]] (used by Online), we want to prove X¯j′l′ ≥ x¯j′l′− c
√
t log(t). Equivalently, our
aim is to prove the following:
PS[θ+ ∆θ]≥ PS[θ]− c
√
t log(t) w.p. 1− c/t2.
We argue via Lagrangian relaxation. The Lagrangian of the selection problem with parameters
θ+ ∆ is given by
L(x, λ;θ+ ∆θ) = xj′l′ +λ0
(∑
j,l
fjl(qjl + ∆qjl)xjl− v−∆v
)
+
∑
i
λi
(
bi−
∑
j,l
aij(qjl + ∆qjl)xjl
)
+
∑
j
λj
(
zj + ∆zj −
∑
l
xjl
)
=L(x, λ;θ) +λ0
(∑
j,l
fjl∆qjlxjl−∆v
)
−
∑
i
λi
∑
j,l
aij∆qjlxjl +
∑
j
λj∆zj
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Define D := {x : x≥ 0, ||x||∞ ≤ t}. Observe that both PS[θ] and PS[θ+ ∆θ] have solutions x∈D.
From Lemma 5 and Lemma 11 we have the following with probability 1− c/t2:
|∆qjlxjl| ≤
√
t log(t) ∀x∈D, ∆v≤
√
t log(t), ∆zj ≥
√
t log(t).
Let λ? be the optimal dual variables of PS[θ+∆θ]. We claim that there is a constant c such that
||λ?||∞ ≤ c. Assuming this claim, from the previous equation we get
L(x, λ;θ+ ∆θ)≥L(x, λ;θ)− c
√
t log(t) ∀x∈D.
Using Strong Duality for the problem PS[θ+ ∆θ] we have
PS[θ+ ∆θ] = max
x≥0
L(x, λ?;θ+ ∆θ)
= max
x∈D
L(x, λ?;θ+ ∆θ)
≥max
x∈D
L(x, λ?;θ)− c
√
t log(t)
≥ PS[θ]− c
√
t log(t).
In the last step we used weak duality. Finally, to bound ||λ?||∞ ≤ c we observe that the dual feasible
region is defined by λ≥ 0 and the following set of inequalities, where δ is the Kronecker delta:
−fjlqjlλ0 + qjl
∑
i
aijλi +λj ≥ δj′l′ ∀j, l.
These inequalities are independent of (t,b), hence we can bound uniformly the extreme points. 
Appendix D: Additional Details from Section 6 (Distribution-Agnostic Knapsack)
Proof of Theorem 4. To apply Theorem 5, we first bound the measure of the exclusion sets
B and the “disagreement” sets Q. Recall that B(t, b) is given in Lemma 8 and Q(t, b) is the event
where Uˆ t is not a satisfying action.
Let σ : [n]→ [n] be an ordering of [n] w.r.t. the ratios r¯j := rjwj such that σj = 1 if j has the
highest ratio. Similarly, let σˆt : [n]→ [n] be the ordering w.r.t. ratios R¯tj :=Rtj/wj.
Call Et the event B(t,Bt)∪Q(t,Bt), then
P[Et] = P[Et, σ= σˆt] +P[Et, σ 6= σˆt]≤ P[Et, σ= σˆt] +P[σ 6= σˆt].
Let N tj be the number of type-j samples observed by the beginning of period t. By definition,
since we are given a sample of each type before the process starts, we have N tj =Z
T
j −Ztj +1. Since
the reward distribution is sub-Gaussian, it satisfies the Chernoff bound (Boucheron et al. 2013)
P[Rtj − rj ≥ x|N tj ],P[Rtj − rj ≤ x|N tj ]≤ e−N
t
jx
2/2 ∀x∈R, (21)
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A union bound relying on Eq. (21) gives that
P[σ 6= σˆt|Ft]≤ P[∃j s.t. |r¯j − R¯tj| ≥ δ/2|Ft]≤ 2
∑
j
e−N
t
j (wjδ)
2/8.
The variable N tj , recall, is the number of type-j samples observed by the beginning of period t,
hence N tj −1 is a Bin(T − t, pj) random variable. It a known fact that, given θ > 0, E[e−θBin(p,m)] =
(1− p+ pe−θ)m, thus
P[σ 6= σˆt] =E[P[σ 6= σˆt|Ft]]≤ 2
∑
j
e−(wjδ)
2/8(1− pj + pje−(wjδ)2/8)T−t.
Upper bounding by a geometric sum yields
Regret2 :=
∑
t
P[σ 6= σˆt]≤ 2
∑
j
1
pj(e
(wjδ)
2/8− 1) ≤ 2
∑
j
8
pj(wjδ)2
. (22)
We are left to bound P[Et, σ = σˆt]. Let us assume w.l.o.g. that the indexes are ordered so that
r¯1 ≥ r¯2 ≥ . . . ≥ r¯n. The optimal solution of (P [Bt,r,Zt]), i.e., Offline’s problem, is to sort the
items and accept starting from j = 1, without exceeding the capacity Bt or the number of arrivals
Ztj . Mathematically, the optimal solution X
?t to (P [Bt,r,Zt]) is
X?t1a = min
{
Zt1,
Bt
w1
}
, X?tja = min
{
Ztj ,
Bt−∑i<j wiX?tia
wj
}
j = 2, . . . , n.
For the proxy (P [Bt,Rt, µ(t)]), the optimal solution has the same structure with Ztj replaced
everywhere by µj(t).
Let ξt = j and U be any action in argmax{Xtj,u : u = a,r}. We study first the case U = a. If
X?tj,a ≥ 1 then U = a would be, by Lemma 8, a satisfying action. If it is not a satisfying action it must
then be that X?tj,a < 1 and since the algorithm chooses to accept it must be also that X
t
j,a ≥ µj(t)/2.
Thus we obtain the following two conditions
X?tj,a < 1⇒
∑
i<j
wiZ
t
i ≥ b and Xtj,a ≥ µj(t)/2⇒
∑
i<j
wiµi(t) +wjµj(t)/2≤ b.
In the case U = r, X?tj,r < 1 and X
t
j,r ≥ µj(t)/2 imply∑
i≤j
wiZ
t
i ≤ b and
∑
i<j
wiµi(t) +wjµj(t)/2≥ b.
In conclusion,
P[Et, σ= σˆt]≤max
{
P
[∑
i≤j
wi(Z
t
i −µi(t))≥
wjµj(t)
2
]
,P
[∑
i≤j
wi(Z
t
i −µi(t))≤−
wjµj(t)
2
]}
.
These probabilities are bounded symmetrically using the method of averaged bounded differ-
ences (Dubhashi and Panconesi 2009, Theorem 5.3). Indeed, using the natural linear function
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f(ξ1, . . . , ξt) =
∑
iwi
∑t
l=1 1{ξl=i}, the differences are bounded by |E[f |Fl] − E[f |Fl−1]| ≤ wmax,
hence
Regret1 :=
∑
t
P[Et, σ= σˆt]≤
∑
t
∑
j
pj exp
(
−2(wjµj(t)/2)
2
tw2max
)
≤ 2
∑
j
(wmax/wj)
2
pj
.
Together with Eq. (22), we have the desired bound. 
Appendix E: Connections to Information Relaxations
Our work is related to the information-relaxation framework developed in (Brown et al. 2010,
Balseiro and Brown 2019). The information-relaxation framework is a fairly general way to endow
Offline with additional information, but at the same time forcing him to pay a penalty for using
this information. The dual problem (with the penalties) is an upper bound on the performance of
the best online policy.
The main distinctions with our approach are:
1. Information Relaxation requires to identify Offline’s filtration and penalties to build a proxy
for Offline’s value function. This proxy can then be used to assess the performance of specific
online policies.
The proxy that is developed—as the true Offline value in our framework—may be difficult
to compute. To overcome this difficulty, (Balseiro and Brown 2019) proposes an approximation
through which penalties can be computed and hence an upper bound can be obtained.
2. Our framework requires, as well, identifying a suitable information structure (a filtration) and
a relaxation ϕ. Because we allow for a Bellman Loss, we can develop ϕ ϕˆ that are computationally
tractable. In most cases, a linear program. The framework explicitly then provides a mechanism,
the rabbi algorithm, to derive a good online policy.
There is also an explicit mathematical connection. To state it, we first present a weaker version
of our Bellman Inequalities, called thus because it is easier to find an object ϕ under this definition.
Recall that, for a given non-anticipatory policy pi, we denote vonpi the expected value. Observe that
the distinction with Definition 2 is in the initial ordering condition; we now require φ to upper
bound the online value instead of the best offline.
Definition 6 (Weak Bellman Inequalities). The sequence of r.v. {ϕ(t, s)}t∈T,s∈S satisfies
the Weak Bellman Inequalities w.r.t. filtration G and events B(t, s)⊆Ω if ϕ(t, s) is Gt-measurable
for all t, s and the following holds:
1. Initial ordering: maxpi v
on
pi ≤E[ϕ(T,ST |GT )], where ST is the initial state.
2. Monotonicity: ∀s∈ S, t∈ [T ], ω /∈B(t, s),
ϕ(t, s|Gt)≤max
u∈U
{R(s, ξt, u) +E[ϕ(t− 1,T (s, ξt, u)|Gt−1)|Gt]}. (23)
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In Proposition 2.1 in (Balseiro and Brown 2019) it is shown that if ϕ is some function that
satisfies the Bellman equation for Offline with the penalized immediate rewards function, then,
in particular, it satisfies the initial ordering above. Since such ϕ satisfies, by construction, the
Bellman inequality the following is an immediate corollary.
Proposition 4 (Proposition 2.1 in (Balseiro and Brown 2019)). Given feasible penalties
zt, the penalized value function satisfies Definition 2 with exclusion sets B(t, s) =∅.
Our framework is a structured approach for building a computationally tractable ϕ, and deriving
an online policy is bounded regret, without pre-computing penalties.
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Appendix F: Parameter for the Pricing Instance
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